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Executive Summary 
 
A new Bribery Act received Royal Assent in April 2010.  Many City businesses 
are unprepared for the impact this will have on their businesses, in particular 
the provisions for corporate liability and personal liability of directors.  
Companies need to put in place robust anti-corruption procedures as a 
matter of urgency to mitigate these risks. 
 
This report provides an overview of corruption risk for City businesses, focusing 
on the issues raised by the Bribery Act.  It describes the Act and seeks to 
minimise uncertainty for City businesses about how it will be interpreted and 
enforced once it comes into effect.  It also highlights the types of business 
activity which put City businesses at greatest risk in relation to bribery and 
prosecution. 
 
The Bribery Act is expected to reinforce the UK’s international reputation for 
setting high standards in the regulation of economic activity and as a country 
that takes corruption seriously.  A comparison with other leading international 
financial centres (see Table 3, page 41) indicates that UK regulation and 
enforcement are already among the best in the world, and around half of 
our survey respondents thought that London was less corrupt than other 
leading financial centres, while only 3% thought that it was more corrupt.  
 
However, the research conducted for this report also suggests that many City 
businesses engage in activities or operate in environments that expose them 
to risk of corruption, such as: 
• Operating in countries where corruption is perceived to be high.  
• Interacting with public officials.   
• Providing services to high-risk sectors such as construction.   
• Using agents, relying on subsidiaries, or entering into joint ventures.  
 
The drive to win new business can create pressures to cut corners, for 
example to skimp on due diligence or use local fixers about whom little is 
known.  Businesses may also face strong pressures to pay facilitation 
payments to avoid delays in transactions.  However, the new Bribery Act 
imposes strict penalties on individuals as well as companies if they bow to 
these pressures.  Moreover, it puts the onus on companies to prevent bribery 
and corruption from occurring.   
 
The results of the survey, which was carried out immediately prior to the 
passing of the Bribery Act, suggest a relatively high degree of complacency 
about bribery and corruption risks among City businesses.  It is important to be 
aware of bribery and corruption risks, however, particularly in light of the new 
Act, because:  
• Some common activities not previously seen as corrupt could be 
interpreted as such under the new Bribery Act.  Providing extravagant 
hospitality to clients is one such area. 
• Some parts of the City engage in core business activities where there is 
a higher risk of corruption.  But many businesses in sectors that are 
generally low-risk also engage in high-risk activities occasionally. 
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Table 1: The Effect of the Bribery Act on Business Practices 
Example business practices: Are they affected by the Bribery Act? 
 
Taking clients on trips that combine business with golf, skiing or 
shooting 
 
YES  
Making facilitation payments to achieve or speed up routine 
procedures when doing business overseas 
YES 
Using local fixers or consultants to advise on tenders 
 
YES 
Allowing subsidiaries to arrange business on behalf of a UK parent 
company 
YES 
 
According to our survey: 
 
Many City businesses are inadequately prepared for the new UK bribery law…  
Only one in four respondents considered themselves well informed about the 
Bribery Act, while a recent survey by law firm Eversheds found that one in five 
businesses had no policy in place to address corrupt practices.   
 
…but City businesses may well be at risk  While 51% of respondents thought that 
City businesses would not pay bribes as a matter of principle it is significant that 
nearly half thought that City businesses would pay bribes in some circumstances.  
One-third of respondents to our survey thought that City businesses are willing to pay 
bribes as standard practice in some environments.   
 
Chart 1 
Do  yo u think  mo st City  co mp a nie s  whe n o p e ra ting  in the  UK o r 
o ve rse a s (tick  a ll  tha t a p p ly ): 
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
Will not pay bribes
as a matter of
principle.
Are willing to pay
bribes as part of
standard business
practice in some
environments.
Are usually willing to
pay bribes if they
can avoid being
implicated.
Are not aware if their
employees are
paying bribes.
 
 
 
…and there is little faith in internal procedures to catch corruption…  In our 
survey, only one in ten respondents thought that current efforts by internal 
auditors and compliance departments to identify corruption were ‘very 
successful’.  One in five respondents thought typical levels of due diligence 
were seriously inadequate to discern whether customers, business partners 
and/or transactions are corrupt.  
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Chart 2 
In g e ne ra l, d o  yo u think  tha t typ ica l le ve ls  o f d ue  d ilig e nce  a re  
a d e q ua te  to  d isce rn whe the r cus to me rs , b us ine ss  p a rtne rs  a nd /o r 
tra nsa ctio ns a re  co rrup t?
Adequate 26.7%
Somewhat inadequate 40.0%
Seriously inadequate 23.3%
Don't know 10.0%
 
 
Bribery has in the past sometimes been seen as simply a cost of doing 
business, but the new law changes the equation...  The Bribery Act 
significantly strengthens UK law on bribery and will be much easier to enforce.   
Meanwhile, the Serious Fraud Office, Financial Services Authority and City of 
London Police are all taking a tougher stance towards bribery and corruption. 
 
Prevent and Disclose…  The regulatory approach contains two main 
messages.  First, companies should introduce robust procedures to prevent 
corruption from occurring.  Second, they should also be ready to quickly and 
fully disclose any contentious, risky or evidently corrupt conduct.  Ultimately, 
they should be prepared to pass up business opportunities where the risk of 
corruption is high. 
 
Companies should be aware that: 
• They can face unlimited fines, while directors can be imprisoned for up 
to ten years for failing to have ‘adequate procedures’ to prevent 
bribery. 
• Hospitality, publicity, insider information, and donations to charity 
could all be considered as bribes in certain circumstances. 
• An individual can be liable for accepting an advantage even if 
he/she did not know that the other party intended to induce improper 
conduct. 
• Companies can be liable for bribes paid by subsidiaries, agents or 
partners in joint ventures. 
 
Little or no adverse impact on City competitiveness…  Our research also 
suggested that the Bribery Act is unlikely to have a significant negative 
impact on the City of London’s global competitiveness.  Few companies are 
likely to be deterred from doing business in such a large and important 
market and the positive impact on the City’s reputation in terms of 
maintaining high standards and reputation is likely to be far more important 
for most businesses.  
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Recommendations 
 
Recommendations for companies 
• Companies should assess their vulnerability to corruption risk in all areas 
of business and their potential exposure and liabilities under the new 
Bribery Act. 
• Companies should design and implement robust procedures to 
prevent bribery and corruption occurring. 
 
Recommendations for professional associations  
• Professional associations should advise their members on how to deal 
with sector-specific corruption risks. 
 
Recommendations for regulators 
• Regulators should assist with educating companies about the new law 
and the framework for enforcement, including advice on specific 
areas such as facilitation payments. 
• UK enforcement agencies should develop a consistent and 
transparent approach to settlements and plea bargains. 
• The UK government and regulatory bodies should encourage the 
OECD Working Group on Bribery to work for a ban on facilitation 
payments under the OECD Convention, in order to ensure a level 
playing field. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This report provides an overview of corruption risk for City businesses, focusing 
on the issues raised by the Bribery Act.  It describes the Act and seeks to 
minimise uncertainty for City businesses about how it will be interpreted and 
enforced once it comes into effect.  It also highlights the types of business 
activity which put City businesses at greatest risk in relation to bribery and 
prosecution. 
 
The Bribery Act is expected to reinforce the UK’s international reputation for 
setting high standards in the regulation of economic activity and as a country 
that takes corruption seriously.  A comparison with other leading international 
financial centres (see Table 3, page 41) indicates that UK regulation and 
enforcement are already among the best in the world.  
 
Previous research has suggested that financial services, the sector which 
dominates the City of London, is not typically seen as a high-risk sector, unlike, 
for example, the defence, construction or natural resources sectors.  The 
Transparency International Bribe Payers’ Index (BPI) 2008 found banking and 
finance to be perceived as one of the cleanest sectors in terms of bribery of 
public officials. 
 
However, the City of London∗ and the UK financial services sector are under 
close scrutiny at the moment as explanations are sought for the current 
financial crisis.  There are pressures to tighten regulation and to enforce 
current laws and regulations more strictly.  The Serious Fraud Office (SFO), 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) and City of London Police (CoLP) are all 
increasingly active in investigating corruption and corruption risk in the City. 
 
The Bribery Act, which was enacted in April 2010, is not a product of the 
current mood.  It is rather the culmination of several attempts to reform UK 
laws on corruption over many years.  However, the current mood will shape 
the environment in which the Act comes into effect, the way its provisions are 
interpreted and the manner in which it is enforced. 
 
Our research suggests that few City businesses are aware of the implications 
of the Act, and that even among those who have heard of it, there is often a 
perception that it is not relevant to the City.  Bribery is seen as a blight that 
affects other sectors, or at worst a few niche areas of the City.   
 
By contrast, the research reveals that many City businesses face legal, 
financial and reputational risks from corruption in a number of areas of their 
work.  In the light of the Bribery Act, many businesses are likely to need to 
review their anti-corruption procedures or put new systems in place. 
                                                 
∗ We define the ‘City of London’ and the ‘City’ broadly, to include all companies 
physically based in the Square Mile as well as financial services companies located in 
London but outside the Square Mile and other companies whose primary business is 
with companies based in the Square Mile.  The ‘City’ is also used to refer to the wider 
financial services sector throughout the UK. 
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Methodology 
 
This report delivers the findings of primary research.   
 
We have conducted 20 in-depth interviews with senior executives from a 
broad range of City businesses.  These have allowed us to collect rich 
information about the risks in particular sectors and the experiences of 
individuals in real transactions.  The scenarios described in this report, 
although all hypothetical, have been constructed on the basis of these 
discussions.   
 
On the all-important issue of how the Bribery Act will be interpreted and 
enforced, we have had the benefit of insights from two high-level focus 
groups - City lawyers and City regulators.  The government is expected to 
issue guidance on the new law during 2010, and it is anticipated that the 
formal commencement date of the Bribery Act will be no later than 
December 2010.  Thus, we have drawn upon the expertise of these lawyers 
and regulators to make forward-looking assessments of how the Bribery Act 
will impact on businesses.  
 
We have also collected the views of a wider group of professionals in the City 
through an anonymous online survey, which was completed by 74 
respondents across a wide range of sub-sectors.  This measures experience 
and perceptions of corruption in the City as well as views about the legislative 
and regulatory environment.  It goes beyond many surveys of corruption to 
ask respondents what exactly they regard as corrupt.  Although the response 
rate was low and we cannot claim that the sample is statistically 
representative, the results provide a snapshot of opinion among City 
professionals in mid-level and senior positions across a range of sub-sectors. 
 
The findings (and indeed the relatively low response rate and sample size) are 
consistent with other business surveys on bribery and corruption, although our 
survey focuses on the City exclusively.  It is also possible that there was some 
selection bias in our sample, with individuals who were more aware of the 
wider context of bribery or had perhaps had personal experience of the 
negative impacts being more inclined to fill out the survey.  Finally, it should 
be noted that in corruption research people usually regard (or report) others 
as more corrupt than themselves.  
 
The research has been overseen by an Advisory Group comprising senior City 
figures with expertise in this field, who have helped to inform the approach 
and review the material.  
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2. The Bribery Act 
[see Appendix A for extracts] 
 
A new law on bribery received Royal Assent in April 2010.  The Bribery Act’s 
key provisions are expected to come into effect during 2010.  There is 
currently uncertainty over the precise commencement date as it will be 
announced by the new government after the forthcoming general election.  
However, the commencement date is almost certain to be between 1st 
October 2010 and 6th April 2011. This report assesses, among other aspects of 
corruption risk, what the new law means for the City of London and the UK 
financial services sector.   
 
Background to the Act 
 
The UK has had laws against bribery for more than 100 years…  The UK 
already has laws against bribery, but they date back to the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries and were intended to deal with the problems of the 
time.  In any case, the laws were rarely enforced and it was difficult to get 
convictions.  
 
…and many failed attempts to reform them.  Both the 1976 Royal Commission 
on Standards in Public Life chaired by Lord Salmon and the 1995 Nolan 
Committee recommended reform of corruption laws.  Then in 1998, the Law 
Commission, an independent body set up by parliament to keep the law 
under review and recommend reform where necessary, turned its attention to 
the issue.  The Commission’s report argued that existing corruption laws were 
inconsistent and lacked a sound definition of corrupt conduct.  This led to an 
attempt to introduce a Corruption Bill in 2003 but the bill was heavily criticised 
by the Joint Committee that examined it.   
 
Pressure from the OECD created momentum for change…  The Law 
Commission’s response solved many of the technical issues which had 
created opposition to the 2003 bill.  However, the Working Group on Bribery, 
that oversees the 1997 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Convention on combating bribery of foreign public 
officials (OECD Convention), was crucial in generating momentum for 
change.  The OECD Convention was notionally implemented in the UK in 
2001, as part of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act.  Under this law, UK 
companies and nationals could be prosecuted in the UK for an act of bribery 
committed wholly overseas.  But in its monitoring reports, the OECD came 
down hard on the UK for the weakness of its anti-bribery laws and consequent 
deficiencies in the enforcement of the OECD Convention.   
  
…as did the BAE Systems case.  Other European countries were also slow to 
clamp down on bribery, despite signing up to the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention.  Yet the UK came under the spotlight because of the BAE 
Systems case and the Government’s decision in December 2006 to terminate 
the SFO investigation of major bribery allegations in relation to a UK-Saudi 
defence contract.  Other EU countries have faced high-profile bribery cases, 
not least Germany with a major case against Siemens under the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) settled in 2008 and a more recent FCPA case 
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involving Daimler.  However, the UK Government’s response to the BAE 
Systems case apparently revealed a complacency towards corruption which 
belied the UK’s reputation for clean and transparent business, and discredited 
the government’s new anti-corruption strategy that had been announced in 
November 2006.   
 
The BAE Systems case considerably damaged the UK’s reputation.  In the 
2009 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which ranks 180 countries according 
to perceived levels of public sector corruption (see Appendix B), the UK 
slipped down the table to an all-time low of 17th place (level with Japan and 
just ahead of the US).  The government realised that it needed to address the 
UK’s declining reputation and the increasing criticism from the OECD’s 
Working Group on Bribery.  It was clear that a lingering reputation for not 
living up to its international anti-corruption commitments would be highly 
damaging for the UK and its businesses, and indeed for the standing of the 
City of London as a global financial centre with the highest standards.   
 
And the new Bribery Act is a robust and far-reaching response…  Following a 
public consultation on bribery law reform by the Home Office, the Law 
Commission was asked to undertake another study.  In its report published in 
2008, it proposed an approach to bribery that will be much easier to enforce 
and much more difficult for businesses to circumvent.  This approach is 
embodied in the new Act. 
 
The new Bribery Act  
 
The new law represents a shift in approach from its predecessors.  Although 
giving and receiving bribes was already forbidden, the old laws were 
formulated according to a principal/agent relationship.  The new model 
instead formulates the offences as an intention to induce improper conduct.  
The Act also creates a discrete offence of bribing a foreign public official and 
a new offence of failure of corporates to prevent bribery.  The latter 
represents an initial effort to address the issue of strict corporate liability for 
bribery.  The Law Commission is currently engaged in a comprehensive study 
on corporate liability, likely to be completed in the next one to two years.       
 
The Offences 
 
The Bribery Act sets out four offences: 
• Clause 1: Offering a bribe to another person and intending the 
advantage to induce a person to perform a relevant activity 
improperly or offering a bribe and knowing or believing that 
acceptance would itself constitute improper performance of a 
relevant function.   
• Clause 2: Accepting a bribe and intending that, in consequence, a 
relevant function or activity will be performed improperly.   
• Clause 6: Bribery of a foreign public official and intending to influence 
that individual in his/her capacity as a foreign public official in order to 
obtain or retain business or an advantage in the conduct of business.  
• Clause 7: Failure of a commercial organisation to prevent bribery.  A 
commercial organisation is guilty of this offence if an employee or 
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other person associated with it bribes another person intending to 
obtain or retain business or a business advantage for the company.  It 
is a defence for a company to prove that it had in place adequate 
procedures designed to prevent persons associated with it from 
undertaking such conduct. 
 
The Penalties  
 
• Individuals guilty of the Clause 1, 2 or 6 offences could be imprisoned 
for up to ten years, or face an unlimited fine, or both.   
• Company directors could be liable to prosecution for failure to 
maintain ‘adequate procedures’ and face up to ten years’ 
imprisonment. 
• Companies guilty of the corporate offence of failing to prevent bribery 
could face unlimited fines, although the size of the fine will be related 
to ability to pay, size of bribe and advantage obtained, among other 
considerations.   
• Companies might also be banned from bidding for public contracts for 
a number of years, in line with the 2004 European Union (EU) 
Procurement Directive (Article 45), that provides for mandatory 
debarment of companies convicted of bribery or fraud.  
  
Uncertainty about interpretation 
 
With any new piece of legislation, there are uncertainties about how it will be 
interpreted and enforced.  There are several areas which might be 
contentious in the new law.   
 
Gifts, hospitality and donations could all be seen as bribes…  The law defines 
a bribe as a ‘financial or other advantage’.  This has a much broader reach 
than the handing over of packages of cash in brown envelopes.  Many types 
of advantage are commonly given or received in City business, including 
gifts, hospitality, political or charity donations and publicity.  The provision of 
other advantages already known to be contentious, such as insider 
information or jobs awarded to relatives of business partners, could also be 
prosecuted under the Act.   
 
…even if given after a service is provided…  The law is also flexible as to the 
timing of the bribe and the improper conduct: a bribe is still a bribe if it is paid 
as a reward after the event.  With gifts, it might be more difficult to link the 
‘advantage’ to the ‘bribe service’, but arguing that gifts do not affect 
business decisions is not likely to be an easy defence.  In our focus groups with 
lawyers and regulators, there was consensus that any of these advantages 
could be seen as bribes under the law.  Hospitality and entertainment in 
particular emerged as a grey area, to be discussed in the next section.   
 
…and individuals can be liable even for unwittingly giving or receiving.  It is 
not necessary for the bribe to be paid or the improper function executed for 
the law to apply.  It is enough if a bribe is offered or promised with the 
intention of inducing improper conduct, for the Clause 1 offence to apply.  
Similarly, it is sufficient if an individual agrees to receive or accepts an 
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advantage intending to act improperly as a result, for the Clause 2 offence to 
apply.  In other words, it is possible that a company would pay a bribe, fail to 
receive the promised advantage, and still find that it had broken the law.  
 
Not just UK-incorporated companies…  The Clause 7 offence – failure to 
prevent bribery – applies to any company or partnership that carries on a 
business, or part of a business in the UK.  The law can thus apply to foreign 
companies that are registered, incorporated, listed or carrying out their main 
business outside the UK, if they carry out part of their business in the UK.  And 
the Act applies to conduct that takes place outside the UK.  Thus, to take an 
example, a German company that carries out business in the UK could be 
liable for the Clause 7 offence in relation to a bribe that it paid in, say, 
Indonesia. 
 
Exposure through subsidiaries…  The Clause 7 offence applies to relevant 
commercial organisations, that is, companies that are incorporated in the UK 
or incorporated outside the UK but carrying on business or part of a business in 
the UK.  This raises the possibility that non-UK businesses with some operations 
in the UK could be prosecuted through their UK subsidiaries. 
 
Scenario I: Liability for a Parent Company’s Actions Elsewhere 
 
A company based in Japan has a wholly-owned UK subsidiary.  The Japanese 
parent company pays a bribe whilst conducting business in China.  Could the 
Japanese company be liable under UK law? 
 
In this scenario, it is possible that the UK subsidiary could be liable for the 
Clause 7 offence in respect of the bribe paid by the Japanese parent 
company in China, although only if it could be established by the prosecution 
that the parent company was at the time performing service for or on behalf 
of the subsidiary and the bribe was to obtain or retain business for the 
subsidiary.  
 
A parent company’s liability for a subsidiary is one of the issues due to be 
considered by the Law Commission’s general review of corporate criminal 
liability in the future.  The Commission’s conclusions are likely to inform 
enforcement in this area. 
 
The Bribery Act should be taken as seriously as the FCPA…  Companies which 
are listed in the US or do business in the US may be more concerned about 
the FCPA.  As of February 2010, the US Department of Justice was 
investigating nine British companies for alleged bribery incidents overseas, 
and some heavy fines have been imposed in the past.  However, the Bribery 
Act should not be considered as weaker than the FCPA.  While the FCPA 
focuses on bribery of foreign government officials, the UK Act makes bribery 
of private citizens illegal too.  The FCPA partially excludes facilitation 
payments whereas the UK Bribery Act does not.  In terms of penalties, 
whereas the FCPA sets a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment per 
offence, the Bribery Act has penalties of up to ten years per offence.  
Companies which feel they have protected themselves adequately for the 
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FCPA cannot be complacent about the Bribery Act due to these essential 
differences. 
 
Companies can be prosecuted for the actions of agents as well as 
employees…  Companies may be liable to prosecution for failing to prevent 
bribery even if the advantage is offered, promised or given through a third 
party.  Thus, it is not possible for a parent company to avoid responsibility for 
bribery by using a subsidiary, agent, or joint venture partner (however small 
the stake) to execute a bribe.  They need to show that they have adequate 
procedures in place to prevent subsidiaries or partner companies in joint 
ventures (as well as their own employees) from engaging in bribery.  It is not 
enough to plead ignorance. The Clause 7 offence does not automatically 
make a parent company liable for failing to prevent bribery by a subsidiary, 
but liability can arise if the subsidiary was performing services on behalf of the 
parent company.  Whether this is the case can only be determined by 
reference to all the relevant circumstances including but not restricted to the 
nature of the relationship between the subsidiary and parent company.  
 
Example: Balfour Beatty’s Egyptian joint venture 
 
In 2005, Balfour Beatty found evidence of improper payments in the accounts 
of an Egyptian partner with which it had been in a joint venture to build a 
grand library in Alexandria in 2001.  It conducted an internal investigation and 
self-reported to the SFO.  By self-reporting, Balfour Beatty helped to ensure 
lenient treatment.  The SFO decided to use the civil route rather than 
launching criminal proceedings and thus, although Balfour Beatty had to 
make a payment of £2.25 million as well as contributing to the cost of the 
proceedings, the company avoided being banned from public works 
contracts.  
 
Cultural differences are not a defence…  The desired outcome of the bribe or 
‘bribe service’ is defined in the Act as a relevant function or activity 
performed improperly.  The Act regards an act as being performed 
improperly if it is performed in breach of a relevant expectation or if there is a 
failure to perform a function or activity and that failure is itself a breach of a 
relevant expectation.  Clause 5 of the Bribery Act spells out an ‘expectation 
test’ to help with defining a relevant expectation.  The expectation is defined 
as what a reasonable person in the UK would expect in relation to the 
performance of type of function or activity concerned.  It is not permissible to 
take into account local customs or practices unless they are permitted or 
required by the written law of the country or territory concerned.   
 
Facilitation payments are bribes under the Bribery Act…  Facilitation 
payments – small payments to facilitate or speed up bureaucratic 
transactions – are regarded as bribes under the Bribery Act.  This represents a 
key difference with the FCPA in the US, where a special defence for 
facilitation payments in effect means they are not prohibited.  Facilitation 
payments are not an offence under the OECD Convention because they are 
not used to obtain or retain business.  However, many EU countries have 
banned facilitation payments, and in December 2009 OECD Secretary-
General Angela Gurria launched a bid to ban them globally.  In the UK, the 
  13 
SFO clearly argues that facilitation payments could be seen as enabling a 
company to retain business and that repeated payments could certainly be 
seen as bribes.  Thus, facilitation payments do represent an absolute offence, 
although the SFO will nevertheless leave the issue to prosecutorial discretion.   
 
…and the SFO is determined to reduce demand for them.  The SFO has a two-
pronged strategy for reducing the demand for facilitation payments.  First, it 
will encourage companies to report all demands for facilitation payments, so 
that it can gain a better understanding of the extent and nature of the 
practice.  The SFO would then use this information to present cases to the UK 
Department for International Development (DfID) which would help it to 
develop strategies (in collaboration with other donors) to encourage anti-
corruption reforms that would reduce demand for such payments.  Second, 
the SFO will urge countries to obviate the need for facilitation payments by 
creating official fast-tracking procedures for certain bureaucratic tasks.  This 
would enable businesses to pay for faster services in a transparent way, but 
would ensure that the proceeds went to the state.   
 
Enforcement expectations 
 
Enforcement is an unknown quantity with any new law.  Patterns of 
enforcement can also change over time, as with the FCPA, where very few 
cases were prosecuted in the law’s first 20 years but enforcement has been 
much more active since the law was amended to bring it into line with the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 1998.   
 
The government is expected to issue guidance in July…  The key provisions of 
the Act are expected to come into force on 1 October 2010.  The Ministry of 
Justice expects to publish guidance at least three months before the Act 
comes into force, i.e. by 1 July 2010.  This will provide the first indications of 
enforcement strategies and will help companies to ensure that they have 
‘adequate procedures’ in place.  Effective enforcement of the Bribery Act is 
a central element of a new UK Foreign Bribery Strategy presented to 
Parliament by the Secretary of State for Justice in January 2010.  The 
objectives of the Strategy are: strengthening the law; supporting ethical 
business; enforcing the law; and international cooperation and capacity 
building. 
 
There are several enforcers with extensive powers…  In the UK, several 
agencies are involved in enforcing the law and preventing bribery.  The SFO is 
the lead agency on overseas corruption, but the CoLP also has a dedicated 
Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit to investigate such cases.  The FSA also plays an 
important regulatory role.  The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) may 
become involved in investigations where there is a serious or organised crime 
element.  The Revenue & Customs Prosecutions Office, the Crown 
Prosecution Service, and the Department for Business Innovation and Skills 
could also become involved.  These bodies have powers to execute search 
warrants, seek documents and statements from employees and to seize 
computers and other evidence. 
 
  14 
The FSA is tightening enforcement…  The FSA has indicated that it will use the 
criminal powers contained in the Financial Services & Markets Act 2000 more 
widely than it has in the past.  In March 2010, it clamped down on City 
professionals alleged to be involved in a major insider dealing ring.  Previously, 
the FSA demonstrated a tough approach towards bribery in the Aon case.   
 
Example: Aon case - Agents and hospitality 
 
The FSA fined Aon Ltd £5.35 million in January 2009 for failing to take 
reasonable care to establish and maintain effective systems and controls to 
counter the risks of bribery and corruption associated with making payments 
to overseas businesses and individuals.  Aon was found to be in breach of 
Principle 3 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.  Aon engaged in 
two problematic policies: 
 
(i) It used third parties in connection with overseas business, making payments 
to introducers, consultants and co-brokers in Asia and the Middle East.   
 
(ii) It provided lavish travel and entertainment linked to training for foreign 
public officials who were clients, mainly from Latin America and the Middle 
East.   
 
The FSA investigations did not find that Aon Ltd had made corrupt payments, 
but rather that the company had failed to adequately protect itself from the 
risk of such payments being made. 
 
The SFO will look kindly on companies that self-report…  The SFO will 
encourage companies to self report when they have evidence of or suspect 
misconduct by their own employees.  While prosecution of bribery should be 
the norm, the SFO has signalled that it aims to approach with leniency those 
cases where companies report evidence of bribery as soon as they discover 
it.  The SFO, which published guidelines on self-reporting in July 2009, will also 
look more favourably on companies if they work with the authorities to reveal 
the extent of any corruption and reform internal policies appropriately.  In 
particular, the SFO would aim to bring a civil rather than criminal law case, 
which has the advantage for offending companies that they are not 
debarred from bidding for future public works contracts.   
 
...but does not guarantee lenient treatment.  The first UK prosecution against a 
company for overseas corruption, concluded in September 2009, involved a 
company [Mabey & Johnson – see box] which self-reported but where the 
SFO regarded the offence as too serious to be handled through merely civil 
proceedings.  In an important ruling on the Innospec case in March 2010, 
Lord Justice Thomas commented that criminal prosecution is appropriate in 
bribery cases, as are large fines, comparable to those imposed in the US. 
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Example: SFO prosecution of Mabey & Johnson 
 
The Mabey & Johnson Ltd case concerned a supplier of steel bridges.  The 
company made a voluntary disclosure to the SFO of evidence indicating that 
the company had bribed decision-makers in public contracts in Jamaica and 
Ghana between 1993 and 2001.  The new management of Mabey & 
Johnson’s holding company took the decision to disclose the offences to the 
SFO in February 2008 and an investigation was immediately opened.  The 
company pleaded guilty to charges of corruption and breaching UN 
sanctions (in relation to contracts under the Iraq ‘Oil-for-food’ programme). 
Mabey & Johnson was fined £3.5 million, and had to pay a confiscation order 
of £1.1 million and reparations of £1.4 million.  In addition, the company paid 
£350,000 in costs to the SFO and must undergo monitoring at its own expense 
for several years . 
 
 
The SFO has also successfully undertaken its first criminal prosecution of an 
executive of a UK firm for overseas corruption.  Robert Dougall, former vice-
president of DePuy International, a Leeds-based subsidiary of Johnson & 
Johnson, was found guilty of making payments to Greek healthcare officials 
to induce them to buy products from his company.  The SFO’s move to initiate 
this case under existing law, before the passage of the Bribery Act, underlines 
the new tough approach to enforcement.  The new Act would make it easier 
to prosecute such cases. 
 
The City of London Police (CoLP) also investigates corruption overseas…  The 
CoLP set up an Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit in 2007.  Working closely with 
the SFO, the Unit investigates allegations of overseas corruption as well as 
encouraging self-reporting and offering guidance to companies operating in 
countries perceived to be at high risk of corruption.  
 
Example: City Police prosecution over Uganda contract 
 
In September 2008, the CoLP’s Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit successfully 
prosecuted a Ugandan government official who had received payments of 
£52,800 from a UK government contractor.  The payments were purportedly 
made as part of an agency agreement, but were found to be inducements 
to assist in the awarding of contracts.  The Ugandan official was sentenced to 
12 months’ imprisonment. 
 
Yet the authorities still need greater resources…  The UK authorities thus have 
a range of tools with which to tackle allegations of bribery.  UK companies, 
that have found themselves at a disadvantage because their UK or non-UK 
competitors have paid bribes, also have the option to report competitors to 
the SFO in order to initiate an investigation and thus level the playing field.  
Our research suggested that a very small number of prosecutions of this sort 
would increase risk awareness and help to deter companies from putting 
themselves at risk of corruption.   
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In relation to the Bribery Act, companies should be aware that… 
 
• They need to be careful in framing their policies in relation to 
hospitality, procurement of services, use of information, and donations 
to charity or political parties. 
• An individual can be liable under the law for accepting an advantage 
even if he/she did not know that the other party intended to induce 
improper conduct. 
• They can be liable for bribes paid by their subsidiaries, agents, or 
partners in joint ventures. 
• Company directors can be imprisoned for up to ten years if their 
company violates the law. 
• Claiming that payment of a bribe is an inevitable part of doing 
business in a certain country will not be regarded as a valid defence. 
• Facilitation payments are regarded as bribes. 
• They need to have robust anti-bribery systems in place. 
 
Although some uncertainty remains about how the Bribery Act will be 
interpreted and enforced, there is no doubt that it significantly increases the 
legal liability of City businesses, especially those operating in high-risk 
environments.  Yet our research suggests that City businesses appear to be 
largely unaware of the implications of the Act for their own operations. 
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3. Corruption Risk in the City 
 
Businesses in the City of London and the UK financial services sector should 
not be complacent about the risks of bribery and corruption, particularly in 
light of the new Bribery Act, because:  
• The results of our survey, which was conducted immediately prior to 
the passing of the Bribery Act, suggest a relatively high degree of 
complacency about bribery and corruption risks among City 
businesses. 
• Some common activities not previously seen as corrupt could be 
interpreted as such under the new Bribery Act.  Providing extravagant 
hospitality to clients is one such area. 
• Some parts of the City face high risk of corruption by virtue of their core 
business activities.  But many businesses in sectors that are generally 
low-risk also engage in high-risk activities occasionally. 
 
These issues are elaborated below. 
 
The City’s perceptions of bribery  
 
Financial services not seen as corrupt relative to other sectors…  Financial 
services, the sector which dominates the City of London, is not typically seen 
as a high-risk sector, unlike, for example, the defence, construction or natural 
resources sectors.  The relatively tight regulation of financial services is 
regarded as leaving less scope for misconduct than in other industries.  The 
Transparency International Bribe Payers’ Index (BPI) 2008 also found banking 
and finance to be one of the cleanest sectors in terms of bribery of public 
officials.  On the same Index, the UK was ranked level with Germany and 
Japan, and above Singapore and the US, suggesting that UK companies 
were perceived to be relatively less willing to pay bribes overseas compared 
to others. 
 
…but some bribery cases have surfaced…  Relatively few prosecutions of 
bribery and corruption have concerned financial services, even in the US, 
where the FCPA has been in force since 1977.  In the UK, however, one of the 
few cases relating to bribery that has come to light in recent years did 
concern a financial services company – the FSA decision on Aon (described 
in section 2).   
 
…and more are likely as enforcement becomes tougher.  Although tight 
regulation of financial services might mean that instances of misconduct are 
less likely to arise, it also means that there are more bodies monitoring 
conduct in the sector and able to enforce the regulatory and legal 
frameworks.  Companies are thus well advised to pay close attention to 
changes in those frameworks, such as the new Bribery Act. 
 
Survey results show a mixed picture…  Our own survey, albeit based on a 
small sample, revealed a strong perception among City professionals that the 
City of London is not at high risk of corruption while only 6% of respondents 
reported experience of being asked to pay a bribe.  More than half of the 
respondents to our survey thought that people in ‘positions like theirs’ would 
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never pay bribes or take part in other corrupt activities to gain contracts or 
commercial advantage, either in the UK or overseas.  Of those who thought it 
a possibility, only a tiny proportion thought this might happen ‘often’ (1.5% of 
the whole sample), as illustrated in Chart 3. 
 
Chart 3 
Do  yo u think  p eo p le  in po s itions  l ike  yo urs  might pa y b rib es o r 
ta ke  p a rt in o the r co rrup t a c tiv itie s  in the  UK o r o ve rse as if it 
he lp s  to  g a in co ntra c ts  o r comme rc ia l a dva ntag e ?
Often 1.5%
Sometimes 16.7%
Rarely 25.8%
Never 56.1%
 
 
However, 34% of respondents thought that their clients might sometimes pay 
bribes... 
 
Chart 4 
Do  yo u think  c lie nts  o f compa nies  l ike  yo urs  might pa y b rib es o r 
ta ke  p a rt in o the r co rrup t a c tiv itie s  in the  UK o r o ve rse as if it 
he lp s  to  g a in co ntra c ts  o r comme rc ia l a dva ntag e ?
Often 1.6%
Sometimes 34.4%
Rarely 37.5%
Never 26.6%
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...and around 35% thought that their competitors might sometimes pay 
bribes... 
 
Chart 5 
Do  yo u think  co mp e tito rs  o f co mp a nie s  like  yo urs  mig ht p a y 
b rib e s  o r ta ke  p a rt in o the r co rrup t a c tiv itie s  in the  UK o r 
o ve rse a s if it he lp s  to  g a in co ntra cts  o r co mme rc ia l a d va nta g e ?
Often 4.8%
Sometimes 34.9%
Rarely 34.9%
Never 25.4%
 
 
…suggesting a perception that corruption is not so rare for some 
companies…  Strikingly, 47% of respondents thought that City businesses 
would pay bribes under some circumstances.  
 
Chart 6 
Do  yo u think  mo st City  co mp a nie s  whe n o p e ra ting  in the  UK o r 
o ve rse a s (tick  a ll  tha t a p p ly): 
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
Will not pay bribes
as a matter of
principle.
Are willing to pay
bribes as part of
standard business
practice in some
environments.
Are usually willing to
pay bribes if they
can avoid being
implicated.
Are not aware if their
employees are
paying bribes.
 
 
…reinforcing impressions from other surveys.  This fits with the results of the 
Ernst & Young European Fraud Survey 2009, which found that 47% of 
respondents – from the entire European business community – thought that 
one or more types of unethical behaviour was acceptable to help a business 
get through the downturn.  Similarly, 25% of their respondents thought it was 
acceptable to make cash payments to win new business, while 13% of senior 
managers and board members thought that mis-stating financial 
performance was justifiable in today’s economic climate. 
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High-risk factors for City business 
 
Corruption arises when opportunities are great and accountability weak…  
Theory suggests that corruption arises where there are opportunities to be 
corrupt and weak accountability to prevent corruption risks, that is, a lack of 
capacity to monitor or police conduct (Klitgaard 1988).   
 
…which translates into four high-risk factors for City businesses.  The four 
factors that put City businesses at greatest risk of corruption are: 
 
1. Operating in corrupt environments.  ‘Opportunities’ or ‘demands’ for 
bribery tend to be more prevalent in some countries because business 
cultures differ and regulation may be weaker. Moreover, authoritarian 
regimes and/or fragile democratic systems in some countries can 
mean that political leaders and bureaucrats are more likely to abuse 
state power for personal gain. The Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is included in Appendix B as a 
guide to which environments are deemed most corrupt. The KPMG 
Overseas Bribery and Corruption Survey 2009 found that two-thirds of 
respondents believed there were places in the world where they could 
not do business without engaging in bribery and corruption, although 
more than half of respondents had not taken the decision to withdraw 
from those countries.  Several City activities are exposed to this type of 
risk – including commodities trading, investment banks, wholesale 
insurance brokers and retail banks also face risks.  Although anti- 
money laundering laws already require companies to do extensive 
due diligence on transactions that might be related to Politically 
Exposed Persons (PEPs), the Bribery Act requires companies to take this 
risk even more seriously.  As well as those with an obvious exposure, 
such as investment banks through IPOs or project finance, all 
companies need to recognise that liability for corruption of foreign 
public officials is relevant even if they are only indirectly or infrequently 
involved in operating overseas.   
 
2. Interacting with public officials.  Much of the global anti-bribery 
regulation, including the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the FCPA, 
focuses on public officials.   For example, bribes are sometimes paid to 
officials to gain approvals, certification and permits.  Almost all City 
businesses are exposed to such corruption risks in some areas, although 
companies with extensive operations in emerging markets may face 
these issues most frequently.   Corruption risks of a greater magnitude 
arise in relation to bidding in public tenders for contracts, or in doing 
business with PEPs.  These might, for example, affect investment banks 
and retail banks.   
 
3. Providing services to high-risk sectors.  The defence, construction and 
natural resources sectors have often been identified as being high risk 
for corruption – for example, in the BPI.  City businesses interact with 
these sectors when they finance or advise on projects, or provide 
insurance, auditing services or legal advice.  If their clients are 
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engaged in bribery and corruption, this presents both legal and 
reputational risks to the companies which service them. 
 
4. Using agents, counter-parties, relying on subsidiaries, or entering into 
joint ventures.  The conduct of individuals in subsidiaries is difficult to 
control, while joint ventures are often set up without proper due 
diligence to get business deals off the ground, especially in emerging 
markets where cooperation with local businesses is a condition of 
market entry and majority control often not allowed.  Agents often 
face incentive structures which make corruption a temptation, being 
paid on a commission basis for example.  Insurance brokers are a 
typical example of businesses facing this problem, but it could apply to 
any firm relying on local agents.  In many cases when dealing with 
third parties, agents or counter-parties, especially in short time-frames, 
a City firm may never have met the individual or company with which 
they are dealing. 
 
Many City businesses are vulnerable on at least one factor…  Sectors in the 
City can be regarded as highly exposed to corruption if their business is 
characterised by all or most of the factors.  Moreover, companies in sectors 
which are not normally considered to be at high risk of corruption should 
consider which aspects of their business can involve these elements, and pay 
due attention to ensuring that high standards are maintained. In our survey, 
we asked respondents to label sub-sectors and activities of City business as 
low, medium or high risk for corruption.  This revealed some clear patterns of 
perceived corruption risk. 
 
…but some companies could be exposed on all four.  Maritime and shipping 
was seen as high-risk by 38% of respondents, while less than one in five saw 
this area as low-risk.  Commodities trading was also perceived as a risky 
business, as were real estate, project finance, and hedge funds.  Investment 
banking, a category which covers many areas which seems to explain its 
ranking as medium risk, has areas of activity that are exposed to all four high-
risk factors. 
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Table 2 summarises perceptions about a range of sub-sectors. 
 
Table 2: ‘Perceived Corruption Risk’ in City Sub-Sectors 
Ranking Activity 
High Property and Real Estate 
High Maritime and Shipping 
High Commodities Trading 
High Hedge Funds 
High Project Finance 
Medium Private Equity 
Medium Investment Banks 
Medium Insurance 
Medium Accounting & Auditing 
Medium Correspondent banking 
Low Asset Management 
Low Law Firms 
Low Retail Banking 
Source: City of London Corporation/Transparency International Survey on Corruption Risk and 
the City. 
 
Commodities companies may be highly exposed…  Companies in the 
commodities business may be forced to deal with at least three of the high-
risk factors: operating in corrupt environments, interaction with public officials 
(to obtain certificates, negotiate customs procedures etc) and reliance on 
agents.  Commodities traders are also highly exposed to PEPs.  Dictators in 
emerging markets in the past used agents to negotiate false contracts where 
commodities were invoiced at overpriced rates, but the (sometimes 
substantial) overpayment was channelled back to their own accounts.  The 
commodities company thus facilitated the dictator’s efforts to steal from his 
own state, a ‘service’ provided in return for securing the business.  Indeed, 20 
to 30 years ago, corruption was rife in this sector, with our research having 
revealed tales of deals facilitated with gifts of diamond jewellery and use of 
suspense accounts to open hedges on behalf of clients, with winning 
positions allocated to favoured clients at the close of play.   
 
…and must ensure that employees and agents embrace anti-corruption 
policies.  The commodities business has become more tightly regulated in 
recent years and much cleaner, while futures trading has in some ways made 
the market more transparent, at least in casting suspicion on any invoicing 
anomalies.  Yet it remains extremely difficult in corrupt environments to 
adequately inculcate agents in high ethical standards.  Often both producers 
and consumers are located in these high-risk markets, and imposing the costs 
and inflexibility of ethical standards can mean falling profits and loss of 
business.  In extremely unstable markets, certain local agents may offer 
tempting possibilities to reduce the uncertainty of doing business. 
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Scenario II: The Local Police Chief and His Daughter 
 
You work for a UK company trading in metals.  One copper mine from which 
you source is located in a country which is perceived to be highly corrupt on 
the CPI.  Output from the mine is somewhat unpredictable, partly because of 
frequent strikes by the labour force, and partly because the local police 
periodically conduct ‘raids’ on the mine, on the grounds of monitoring 
standards.  Both strikes and raids move the market price.  The local police 
chief offers to provide you with information about the timing of both strikes 
and raids, enabling you to trade on the resulting price movements.  In return, 
he would like you to arrange a job for his daughter in your company.   
 
This scenario is straightforward from the legal point of view.  If the deal is 
struck, the local police chief acts improperly and the company induces him 
to do so by offering not explicit payment, but paid employment for his 
daughter.   
 
The hiring of the daughter could be prosecuted as bribery under previous UK 
law and under the new law, there would be a clear section 6 offence.  This 
case also includes insider trading and hence could also be prosecuted on 
that basis providing evidence could be secured. 
 
Shipping companies need policies to deal with frequent demands for bribes…  
Given that operating in corrupt environments is a key risk factor, it is not 
surprising that the sectors of maritime and shipping and commodities are 
perceived as high risk.  Risks in maritime and shipping largely relate to 
demands for facilitation payments to cross borders quickly or reduce tariff 
payments.   
 
…while monitoring of smaller shipping companies could be improved.  
Moreover, smaller shipping companies based in the City often act as 
intermediaries, chartering ships for specific jobs, financing trade, or buying 
and selling small amounts of commodities. There is considerable scope for 
inducements and commission payments that could be interpreted as bribes.  
Such companies may be especially prone to take a flexible approach to 
business ethics if they are not FSA-registered.  
 
Real estate companies should be aware of money-laundering risk…  Judging 
by our research, the perception of real estate and property as high-risk – with 
52.5% of respondents labelling it as such – probably reflects two 
characteristics of this sector.  First, real estate is at risk of being used for money 
laundering as wealthy corrupt tycoons from overseas bring their money to 
London.  Second, there is often a need to gain permits or licences to use or 
adapt real estate.   
 
…but any City company could face permit or licensing issues connected to 
real estate.  Obtaining planning permission is vulnerable to corruption in many 
countries, including the UK and other countries in Western Europe.   
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Scenario III: The Planning Officer and the Music Festival 
 
You are the European head of a UK-based bank.  You open a new branch in 
a West European city, in a historic building.  However, you soon realise that 
you need to adapt the building to make it more secure.  You consult the 
Planning Office of the Municipality, which sends out an officer to inspect the 
site.  He tells you at length how difficult it will be to obtain a permit to alter 
such a historic building, but nonetheless indicates that it can be done.  In the 
same breath, he relates how the Municipality is having trouble attracting 
funding for its annual music festival.  He signals that if you make a donation to 
the festival, you will obtain your permit quickly. 
 
In this scenario, the planning officer does not openly demand a bribe.  Nor is 
it clear that he personally benefits from the donation, although it is possible 
that his sister is running the music festival or that his brother’s company 
provides services that make the festival possible.    
 
However, under the new Bribery Act, it is possible that the donation would be 
seen as provision of an advantage intended to induce improper conduct.  If 
the Planning Officer is induced to act improperly, the bank head could be 
liable under the new law.   
 
Investment banks should be cautious about extending lavish hospitality…  
Seen as medium-risk by most of our survey respondents, investment banks are 
more exposed through some activities than others.  The interface between 
securities brokers and their clients is one vulnerable point for bribery.  
 
Scenario IV: The Formula One Trip  
 
You work in a UK-regulated investment bank selling emerging market 
securities to clients.  You arrange a three-day trip for 20 of your team’s top 
clients to the capital city of one of your markets.  The programme includes a 
seminar about the local capital market, a wine-tasting evening in the 
countryside, tickets to the Formula One, and fine dining.  After the trip, you 
call the clients offering them deals on which the margins you would earn are 
well above market rates.  
 
There is an evident risk of liability under the new bribery laws in this case, since 
the prosecution could argue that the trip was a bribe to obtain or retain 
business.  Liability is by no means certain.   
 
It might be difficult to prove intent to induce improper conduct, to establish 
the link between the trip and the favourable deal, or to show that the client 
had acted improperly by accepting a deal that was not the best deal for his 
own customers.  However, investment banks cannot be confident that the 
excuse of a research seminar can be used to justify extravagant hospitality.   
 
Insider dealing could be seen as a bribe…  Concerns were expressed about 
various forms of insider dealing, for example ‘front running’, where fund 
managers have to liquidate big equity positions and are able to inform friends 
and family prior to their deals, or take advantage themselves.  Analysts may 
  25 
also provide valuable information to securities brokers in banks.  Yet the 
provision and receipt of insider information could be viewed as a bribe under 
the new law.   
 
…and may thus be easier to prosecute.  Although illegal, insider dealing is 
difficult to control or police, since it is difficult to prove that information has 
been provided by one person to another.  However, the FSA arrested three 
City professionals in March 2010 on suspicion of involvement in a 
sophisticated and long-running insider dealing ring, after an investigation 
lasting more than two years.  Just two weeks previously, the FSA obtained its 
first criminal conviction of a City professional for insider dealing. 
 
Local consultants should not be engaged without thorough due diligence...  
Investment banks may face risks of overseas corruption when they bid to 
advise on privatisations or IPOs, as the following scenario demonstrates. 
 
Scenario V: The Local Fixer  
 
You are a UK investment bank bidding in a tender to become the financial 
adviser to a government as it privatises a major bank.   One of your main 
competitors has won the tenders to advise on three of the past four major 
privatisations.  You mention this to the minister responsible for the privatisation 
agency.  He recommends that you use Consultancy Company X to advise 
you on the tender process.  You duly appoint Company X to advise you, and 
subsequently win the tender.  It later emerges that Company X is owned by 
the minister’s brother. 
 
In this case the bank has not performed adequate due diligence about the 
consultancy company before hiring it.  If the bank had performed due 
diligence it might have become aware of the link to the PEP and would then 
have been best advised to avoid using the company. 
 
Project finance is exposed on several factors…  Project finance brings 
investment banks into a relationship with construction, a sector known for its 
susceptibility to corruption, on projects to build huge infrastructure facilities 
such as motorways, large state buildings like hospitals, or social housing.  Risk 
may also derive from the interface with the public sector, where large sums of 
money might be spent without adequate controls or where control over the 
processes for winning the business or overseeing the project may be 
managed by corrupt officials. Both risks are amplified where the projects 
being financed are in countries where corruption is prevalent. 
 
…and remains risky despite improved regulation  Project finance in the UK 
was associated with some tender irregularities and apparent collusion among 
bidders in the early years of Private Finance Initiatives and Public-Private 
Partnerships.  However, deals in the UK now tend to be carried out with more 
rigorous attention to procedure.  The main risk areas – the tenders to win 
business or act as financial advisers, the appointment of subcontractors to 
carry out the work, and the temptation to scrimp on materials – are now 
better regulated.  
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Banks are warned not to cut corners under pressure…  The main risks in UK 
project finance now arise from rushed implementation.  Where there is 
pressure to complete a project by a certain deadline, procedures for 
appointing contractors may become sloppy.  There is also some concern that 
framework agreements can lead to reduced scrutiny, because once a firm 
has secured such a contract, controls on future work within its remit are less 
tight. 
 
…and to exercise extreme caution about taking advice on tenders…  Banks 
and consultants that act as financial advisers to consortia bidding for 
infrastructure tenders in countries perceived to be at high risk of corruption 
are much more exposed.  
 
Scenario VI: The Helpful Insider 
 
A bank is bidding to be the financial adviser to the consortium that has won 
the tender to build an infrastructure project in a corrupt environment.  An 
official in the relevant ministry provides information to the bank about how 
the criteria have been designed, hoping to be rewarded.    
 
In this scenario, the bank has been offered an advantage by a foreign public 
official.  The advantage is not monetary, but rather comprises valuable insider 
information which could improve the bank’s chances of winning the 
contract.   
 
This information could be regarded as a bribe under the Bribery Act.  Indeed, 
the bank could be liable for accepting a bribe even if it did not know that the 
ministry official hoped to be rewarded and even if it did not provide a 
reward. 
 
…and could face considerable risk from corruption elsewhere in the chain.  
Financial advisers on overseas infrastructure projects also face risks arising 
from corruption within the construction process, even if it they are not directly 
involved. Such risks have been reduced through structured draw-down 
financing schedules, where contractors can only access the next tranche of 
finance if they have fulfilled the terms set out at the time of the previous 
draw-down.   Yet this process can also be prone to corruption in corrupt 
environments.  On large construction projects, it is not too difficult to stop 
digging the foundations a couple of centimetres short of the agreed depth, 
thereby saving huge sums on concrete costs.  Companies simply need to 
‘persuade’ local inspectors to overlook the misconduct and ensure that fake 
invoices for the agreed amount of concrete are produced.  
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Scenario VII: Risk by Association 
 
A financial adviser wins a contract to advise a company that is building social 
housing.  The tender process by which it wins the contract appears to be 
clean.  However, the construction company does not control the process of 
appointing subcontractors, and local staff take kickbacks for providing the 
business to their friends.  The scandal becomes public when the timetable for 
the project slips and the work is revealed to be shoddy.   
 
The financial adviser is unlikely to be liable under the Bribery Act for bribes 
paid by its client, unless the subcontractor that received the bribe was 
performing services on its behalf.  However, it could nonetheless suffer from 
damage to its reputation as well as financial risk because of the failure to 
complete the deal and thus potential failure to realise the expected fees.   
 
There are persuasive reasons for doing thorough due diligence before taking 
on such business as well as making it clear to the construction company that 
bribes are not tolerated and that it should do its own due diligence on 
subcontractors. 
 
Banks should not rely on the due diligence of others...  Many infrastructure 
projects in developing or transition countries are supported by the World Bank 
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).  
Opinions differed among those consulted for this research as to the extent to 
which this improves the credibility of a project.  Some of those interviewed 
thought that the World Bank and EBRD’s commitment significantly reduced 
the risk for other funders.  Others were sceptical about the rigour of these 
organisations’ due diligence procedures.   Indeed, one World Bank employee 
has been prosecuted in the US under the FCPA, while the CoLP arrested an 
EBRD employee in connection with a corruption inquiry in March 2010.  It 
seems likely that, even if procedures are robust, the World Bank and EBRD 
face the same difficulties as multinational companies in monitoring their own 
personnel.   
 
Retail banks are a key target for fraud and corruption in corrupt 
environments…  Although seen to be clean in the UK, retail banks face risks in 
their operations overseas.  Many of these risks relate to money laundering and 
fraud, but banks may also come up against demands for bribes.  PEPs may 
wish to open accounts with the banks, in which case banks are required to 
take precautions to avoid facilitating money laundering.  Banks making 
acquisitions overseas may need to do extensive investigations to trace and 
assess the liabilities which they have taken on.   
 
Retail banks are also a target for extortion in corrupt environments…  Retail 
banks operating in corrupt environments overseas often face aggressive 
demands for bribes from agencies of the state or state-owned companies. 
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Scenario VIII: The Tax Inspection 
 
You are the manager of an overseas branch of an international bank with UK 
connections.  One day, the tax authorities send a representative to your 
office unannounced.  She informs you that she plans to carry out an in-depth 
investigation of the bank’s activities and accounts.  She threatens to move in 
to your office for six months and to disrupt business by demanding answers 
and documents from different parts of the bank on a daily basis.  
Alternatively, if you pay her €100,000, she will leave now and not bother you 
again. 
 
The bank manager faces a stark dilemma here.  There is a clear business case 
for paying the bribe: to save the bank the cost of having business disrupted 
(although bribes do not always achieve the intended goals, and there is a 
major risk that paying would open the door to future demands).   
 
Under the new Bribery Act, however, he would be liable under the Clause 1 
or Clause 6 offence if he paid, while his bank could be liable under Clause 7 if 
it could be shown that it did not have adequate procedures in place to 
prevent him from paying the bribe.  (NB given the threat that business would 
be disrupted if the bribe was not paid, it could be argued that the bribe was 
paid to retain business). 
 
Our research revealed other examples which are arguably even closer to 
outright extortion.  One banker described receiving a visit from the electricity 
company threatening to cut off the power unless he made a cash payment.  
Another banker had been told that police protection for the branch would 
take three months to arrange, unless he paid an under-the-table fee.   
 
…and staff should be trained to deal with such situations.  These examples 
demonstrate the real difficulties faced by individuals operating in high-risk 
environments.  When companies design their compliance policies and deliver 
training, they need to equip staff to handle such dilemmas, particularly in the 
face of business pressures or aggressive behaviour. 
 
Insurance brokers need to guard against incentives to be corrupt…  
Corruption risk in the insurance sector arises largely in the broking part of the 
business where the use of agents and payment of commissions are common 
practice.  There are concerns that brokers are influenced by differential rates 
of commission on different products, an issue which is addressed to an extent 
by the FSA Retail Distribution Review.   
 
…and need a better understanding of risks from operating in corrupt 
environments.  The FSA has recently devoted increased attention to the risks 
faced by the wholesale insurance market – the underwriters and brokers that 
make up the Lloyd’s and London Market.  Many insurance brokers who work 
in the London insurance market have clients in countries and sectors that are 
at high risk of corruption, while the insurance of complex deals particularly in 
corrupt environments can expose underwriters to risk, since it is difficult for 
them to collect information about the parties involved in the transaction.  Jon 
Pain, Managing Director of Supervision at the FSA, recently warned about 
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“the risks of venturing into initially attractive areas of new business without the 
necessary knowledge or control infrastructure”. 
 
Auditors have a responsibility to help uncover corruption…  Auditors and 
accountants have the potential to play an important role in uncovering 
bribery and corruption, but this also means that they are potentially exposed 
to risk.  Although auditing is generally seen to have become much more 
professional and strictly regulated over recent years, there is also growing 
concern about the independence of auditors and the incentives they may 
face not to search for possible evidence of corruption because of the need 
to retain business.   
 
…but often face conflicting incentives…  There is concern that the long-term 
relationship between auditor and client can easily become symbiotic.  Rather 
than auditors examining clients and asking them to explain irregularities, some 
clients tend to seek auditors’ advice about how to perform acts of 
questionable ethical standards without breaking the law.  In March 2010 the 
Wall Street Journal reported that Matthew Lee, a former vice-president of 
Lehman Brothers, had been let go in 2008 after raising concerns with the firm’s 
auditor, Ernst & Young, about accounting practices.  Auditors face 
considerable reputational risk through appearing to be complicit in or merely 
associated with corruption.   
 
…and could be more forceful in recommending full systems audits or forensic 
audits.  Auditors  also operate with cost restraints, and might not have the 
resources to thoroughly investigate payments that seem valid at face value, 
while company directors may try to shrug off their questions.   
 
Scenario IX: False Invoices 
 
You are auditing the accounts of a UK-based investment bank.  There is an 
unusually large invoice for a consultancy fee.  The fee was apparently paid 
for services to prepare a bid on a tender to be the financial adviser of the IPO 
of a state bank in a country deemed moderately corrupt on the CPI.  You 
know that your client won the tender.   
 
It is possible that the invoice for the consultancy fee masks a bribe paid to 
secure a contract.  The consultancy company might have been operated by 
the brother of the prime minister of the country concerned, and it might not 
have performed any substantive service.  Then again, it might be an entirely 
legitimate transaction.  In such a scenario, corruption is more likely to be 
uncovered if the company were to commission, or the auditor were to 
recommend, that a full systems audit or forensic audit is carried out.   
 
Law firms can easily become implicated through their clients…  Although law 
firms might not face much corruption risk in the substance of their work, they 
are often implicated in corruption cases through having facilitated corrupt 
transactions.  Law firms may become associated with money laundering, for 
example, through abuse of client accounts.  This came to light in the case 
against former president of Zambia Dr Frederick Jacob Titus Chiluba.   
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…and should monitor use of client accounts.  While Chiluba and several of his 
colleagues were charged with 168 counts of theft totalling more than $40 
million, Chiluba’s lawyer, Iqbal Meer, was implicated through having handled 
$10 million of the stolen money.  Mr Meer successfully appealed the 
judgement against him by arguing that he had not known or suspected the 
dishonesty of his clients.  However, the case demonstrated the risks facing 
lawyers.  Lawyers need to do careful due diligence on their own customers if 
they are to avoid facilitating corrupt transactions.  
 
Asset management companies face risks where agents are used…  Most 
City-based asset management companies make the vast majority of their 
sales in markets at low risk of corruption.  Some exposure may occur through 
sales in high-risk emerging markets, however, particularly when entering new 
markets where it is necessary to rely on local sales agents.  Where 
intermediaries are involved, there is also a risk of their being influenced by 
commission rates, leading to mis-selling.  However, the FSA’s Retail Distribution 
Review is set to lead to a shift away from commission rates towards upfront 
fees.  Other risks are associated with entertainment and hospitality.  
  
Hedge funds need to adopt systems and controls in line with the scale and 
nature of their business…  The fact that a large number of hedge funds are 
registered in jurisdictions with a weaker regulatory and enforcement 
framework may give rise to risks of association with corrupt clients and 
difficulties over monitoring clients.  Hedge funds, in common with most City 
businesses, are also liable to risk through their hospitality and entertainment 
activities. 
 
Hospitality may be important to doing business in the City…  Many of the 
people we consulted for this research took the view that entertainment and 
hospitality were critical facets of doing business in the City, relevant to all sub-
sectors.  One interviewee said, 
 
“eating and drinking with business partners is an essential part of Know 
Your Customer” 
 
…but the potential for this to slide into bribery is widely acknowledged…  It 
was typically thought that a line needed to be drawn, but there was little 
consensus about where or how a distinction could be drawn between 
acceptable and unacceptable levels of hospitality and entertainment.  
Whereas 85% of respondents to our survey thought that buying a client a 
meal costing £50 per head was ‘definitely not corrupt’, when the price of the 
meal was increased to £500 per head, only 10% thought it was definitely not 
corrupt while 30% thought it was ‘definitely corrupt’.  The value of the meal 
appears to be regarded as relevant, although people drew little distinction 
between a £1,000 sports ticket and a £3,000 shooting day.  
 
…and even the appearance of bribery represents a risk.  As one of the survey 
respondents said,  
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“There is a lot of wining and dining in this sector and that probably has a 
hard to measure effect on business decisions, such as with whom asset 
managers decide to execute trades.”  
 
Increasingly, companies are finding that they need not only to be clean but 
also to look clean, if they want to avoid reputational risk. 
 
Lawyers agree that this is a grey area under the new law…  Among the 
lawyers we consulted, there was consensus only that hospitality is a grey area.  
It certainly could be seen as an advantage, although it might be difficult to 
link specific instances of entertainment with specific business advantages, 
and thus difficult to prove intent to induce improper conduct.   
 
…and companies need more sophisticated policies on how and when 
hospitality can be provided.  The regulators with whom we consulted took the 
view that hospitality and entertainment were unlikely to be a focus of their 
investigations once the Bribery Act is in force.  Nevertheless, they warned that 
certain types or patterns of entertainment could be problematic.  For 
example, if a company invites a client and her husband on a skiing holiday 
whilst bidding on an open tender for business from that client, the trip could 
be seen as an attempt to influence the tender outcome.  Nor can 
companies hope to get around the bribery law by giving small but frequent 
gifts; repeated small advantages may be regarded as representing a 
suspicious pattern.  In conjunction with other circumstances, such as 
evidence of a company winning a tender despite putting in an 
uncompetitive bid, or a client accepting a deal on which the provider makes 
an unusually large profit, this could be presented as evidence relevant to a 
bribery case.   
 
Example business practices: Are they affected by the Bribery Act? 
 
Taking clients on trips that combine business with golf, skiing or 
shooting 
 
YES  
Making facilitation payments to achieve or speed up routine 
procedures when doing business overseas 
YES 
Using local fixers or consultants to advise on tenders 
 
YES 
Allowing subsidiaries to arrange business on behalf of a UK parent 
company 
YES 
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4.  Other Corruption Risks 
 
Although this report focuses on bribery and the impact of the Bribery Act, 
other types of corruption risk relevant to the City of London and the UK 
financial services sector are outlined below.  Some of these are also linked to 
bribery.  For example, the payment of bribes is often linked to money 
laundering, while cartels and other forms of collusion often rely on ad hoc 
bribes to conceal their activity or ensure that regulators overlook it.  
Companies and individuals therefore need to understand the ways in which 
different forms of corruption may be related to one another in order to 
protect themselves against bribery.  At a broader level, corruption may affect 
the City in two ways.  First, in an environment that depends on a high degree 
of trust, it has the potential to cause reputational damage to London as a 
financial market.  Second, it may be that there are levels of risk inherent in the 
system that individually may not be of concern to regulators but collectively 
may create undesirable levels of systemic risk. 
 
Conflict of interest.  A conflict of interest occurs when an individual or 
organisation is involved in activities related to more than one interest, where 
involvement in one could negatively impact upon the motivation to carry out 
the other.  Although conflict of interest is most acutely problematic for 
politicians and public servants, it can also apply in a number of business 
situations.  For example, where intermediaries sell investment products to 
clients and receive commission payments from the issuers of those products, 
they arguably face a conflict of interest.  
 
In the City, conflict of interest is, for instance, inherent in the job of investment 
bank analysts or researchers.  Analysts issue reports about companies with 
which their bank does business.  Companies are likely to give the banks more 
business if the reports about them are favourable, and analysts are paid 
bonuses dependent on how well their bank performs.  The analyst thus faces 
a strong incentive to write favourable reports about companies regardless of 
the true nature of their performance.  Although there are strict Chinese walls 
in the City between analyst units and main banking operations, in practice 
these have not eliminated the problem.   
 
Ratings agencies face similar incentive structures.  Issuers of certain financial 
market products rely heavily on ratings agencies to rate their products highly, 
in order to facilitate sales.  Ratings agencies are paid by the issuers and 
hence are also motivated to provide positive ratings.  There is thus a danger 
that the rating provided by the agency will not match the underlying risk.  The 
consequence is that neither analysts nor ratings agencies may provide 
reliable assessments of the risk associated with certain financial products.  
These issues are being tackled by current efforts at regulatory reform, but it 
may be difficult to eliminate vulnerabilities in this area. 
 
Other areas of conflict of interest are regularly coming to light within the 
financial services sector as a result of the additional scrutiny after the banking 
crisis.  This in turn has provoked further action from regulators.  For example, 
the FSA has recently highlighted the poor record of banks in dealing with 
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customer complaints, in cases where employees handling complaints have 
incentives to resolve them in a manner that is unfair to the customer. 
 
Collusion, cartels and market abuse.  Market abuse is the manipulation of 
markets to achieve a benefit for a person or company, often involving the 
use of insider information. It can include dishonest price fixing, bid rigging, or 
the limiting of the supply or production or market share of particular goods or 
services.  Collusion is an agreement between two or more parties to limit 
competition in a market through deceit or fraud of others; cartels are one 
example of collusion.  Project finance is one area prone to such risk, for 
example, by association with construction companies that collude during the 
bidding process over the prices they offer.  This can be motivated by 
companies preferring not to take on a particular project but wishing at the 
same time to avoid being removed from a list of potential contractors – which 
might happen if they were to officially withdraw.  This ‘cover pricing’ is illegal, 
but can be difficult to prove.  The Enterprise Act 2002 criminalised cartel 
activity in the UK and the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) has taken a tough 
stance towards such behaviour.  In 2008, the OFT brought the first prosecution 
under the Enterprise Act when three former Dunlop Oil and Marine executives 
received lengthy jail terms for their involvement in a sophisticated cartel that 
defrauded the Ministry of Defence and others.   In 2009, the OFT fined around 
100 building businesses over £100 million for operating illegal cover pricing 
arrangements.  Several of those involved claimed they had no idea they 
were doing anything illegal. 
 
Money laundering.  Money laundering occurs, according to UK law, when 
any action is taken with money or other property which is either wholly or in 
part the proceeds of a crime that disguises the fact that the property is the 
proceeds of a crime or obscures its ownership.  The UK has improved its anti-
money laundering regime, which is enshrined in the Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002 (POCA) and the 2007 Money Laundering Regulations (MLR).   However, 
there is scope for further improvement, particularly in relation to due diligence 
on PEPs (see Transparency International, Combating Money Laundering and 
Recovering Looted Gains, June 2009).  It is the responsibility of businesses to 
ensure their own compliance, also with regard to joint ventures, acquisitions 
and the signing off of accounts. Any breaches, whether negligent or 
deliberate, can result in serious criminal penalties including imprisonment. 
 
Systemic corruption.  Corruption is seen to be systemic when it arises from 
activities which are an important and routine part of a system, and/or when 
corrupt officials dominate the workings of the state.  Several characteristics of 
the business culture in the City raise systemic corruption risks.  The fast-paced 
and highly complex nature of some City transactions inhibits transparency, for 
example, creating opportunities for misconduct. The sophistication of 
financial engineering has produced a series of complex financial instruments 
which often tend to be highly non-transparent, as well as difficult to value.  
This has particularly been the case with securitised products.  The lack of 
transparency and difficulty of valuation opens up opportunities for deals that 
may fall under the wider definition of corruption.  Financial services 
companies also become involved in advising clients on how to evade tax by 
depositing wealth in jurisdictions with financial secrecy laws.  Some 
  34 
commentators also argue that the bonus culture may tempt individuals to 
prioritise short-term gains over long-term interests.  Chairman of the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) Lord Turner is among those to have warned of such 
dangers.  Individuals might also be tempted to mis-report company results.   
 
Trading in influence.  Trading in influence occurs where a politician or public 
official offers to use his real or supposed power to effect influence to the 
benefit of another person, in exchange for receipt of some advantage.  
Trading in influence typically involves bribery.  Many City businesses lobby 
politicians to change legislation in ways that would benefit their companies, 
while City businesses also sometimes provide donations to political parties.  
There are clear rules about such activities which companies need to be 
careful to respect, but beyond this there is also considerable reputational risk. 
 
A  tick-box compliance system may ignore wider corruption risks…  Each of 
the areas cited above deserves fuller research in its own right.  For the 
purposes of this report, it should be noted by companies that several of the 
activities outlined could be linked to bribery, and therefore create liabilities 
under the Bribery Act, or other related legislation.  Tick-box compliance 
approaches will find it hard to capture and manage these wider risks: a 
company’s anti-corruption procedures need to be sufficiently sophisticated 
to understand, identify and manage the risks that these broader areas of 
corruption may pose. 
 
…and wider risks create scope for further legislation  It is also possible that 
some of these areas will catch the attention of legislators, particularly if they 
are thought to create systemic risk that could pose a risk to economic 
stability.  For example, rating agencies are under investigation by both a US 
Senate sub-committee and the European Commission. 
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5. Managing Risk: Going Beyond Compliance 
 
The starting point: inadequate preparation 
 
Many City businesses appear to be inadequately prepared for the new UK 
bribery laws.  Our survey found that only one in four respondents considered 
themselves well-informed, while a recent survey by law firm Eversheds found 
that one in five businesses had no policy in place to address corrupt 
practices.  The KPMG Overseas Bribery and Corruption Survey 2009 – a survey 
of individuals responsible for compliance in 109 FTSE Allshare companies – 
found that 43% of respondents said their organisation did not have an anti-
bribery and corruption compliance programme. 
 
Chart 7 
Wha t is  yo ur le ve l o f kno wle d g e  a b o ut curre nt UK a nti-b rib e ry  
le g is la tio n and  the  Brib e ry  Bill?  
Never heard of it 7.9%
Heard of it but don’t know
details 36.5%
Am aware and know some
details 30.2%
Well-informed 25.4%
 
 
 
In our survey, only one in ten respondents thought that current efforts by 
internal auditors and compliance departments were ‘very successful’.   
 
Chart 8 
Ho w succe ssful a re  inte rna l a ud ito rs  o r co mp lia nce  d e p a rtme nts  
in d e te c ting  b rib e ry  and  co rrup t p ra c tice s?
Not successful 19.7%
Moderately successful 52.5%
Very successful 9.8%
Don't know 18.0%
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There were also concerns about the effectiveness of typical levels of due 
diligence.  One in five respondents thought it seriously inadequate while two 
in five thought it somewhat inadequate.  
 
Chart 9 
In g e ne ra l, d o  yo u think  tha t typ ica l le ve ls  o f d ue  d ilig e nce  a re  
a d e q ua te  to  d isce rn whe the r custo me rs , b us ine ss  p a rtne rs  a nd /o r 
tra nsa ctio ns a re  co rrup t?
Adequate 26.7%
Somewhat inadequate 40.0%
Seriously inadequate 23.3%
Don't know 10.0%
 
 
However, it is likely that the recent high-profile anti-corruption investigations 
by the SFO and FSA have raised awareness of corruption; and the KPMG 
Overseas Bribery and Corruption Survey suggests a growing willingness to 
investigate alleged misconduct.  In the 2009 KPMG Survey, 39% of 
respondents said that their organisations had conducted anti-bribery and 
corruption investigations in the past two to three years; this compares with 
27% in KPMG’s 2007 Survey.  
 
Adequate procedures and robust systems 
 
Companies should pay careful attention to official guidance…  Companies 
should consult the guidance on adequate procedures that the Ministry of 
Justice is expected to issue by July, as well as the guidance on self-reporting 
that was issued by the SFO in July 2009.  
 
…assess the areas in which they are at risk…  Companies would also be well 
advised to conduct a thorough assessment of the risk areas in their particular 
business activities.  For those concerned about operating in particular 
overseas environments, extensive advice is also offered by the CoLP Overseas 
Anti-Corruption Unit. 
 
…and develop policies that define what the company deems improper 
conduct.  Once they have a good understanding of their risk profile, 
companies should design compliance strategies that work for them.   There 
are no off-the-peg solutions, but there are many sources of advice.  
 
Due diligence on third parties is a priority...  Setting out procedures for 
handling relations with agents and business partners is critical to establishing 
robust procedures.   Any such third-party relationship should be based on a 
written contract documenting expectations which sets out the company’s 
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policy on bribery and corruption and provides for monitoring throughout the 
relationship.   
 
…and should include continuous monitoring.  In the KPMG Overseas Bribery 
and Corruption Survey, only 42% of respondents which had anti-bribery and 
corruption compliance programmes said that these programmes included 
the execution of third-party audits.  Due diligence is also very important for 
companies involved in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), since the successor 
company takes on liability for any transgressions by the acquired entity.  Yet 
evidence suggests that due diligence is often overlooked in fast-paced and 
secretive M&A deals. 
 
Case Study: Aon Ltd £5.5 million FSA fine 
 
Aon Ltd provides an interesting case study because it did have risk prevention 
and anti-corruption systems in place throughout the period in which it 
engaged in the behaviour that led to a £5.5 million FSA fine.  However, the 
FSA found that these systems were inconsistently implemented and 
inadequately monitored.  Notably, the FSA did not establish that illegal 
payments had been made and Aon did not admit to paying bribes.  Aon was 
rather found to have breached Principle 3 of the FSA’s Principles for Businesses 
by failing to take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs 
responsibly and effectively or have in place adequate risk management 
systems. 
 
Aon has since worked closely with the FSA to reform its anti-corruption 
systems: 
 
Staff.  Aon hired a new Global FCPA Compliance Director and a support 
team. 
 
Policies.  The company enhanced its Anti-Corruption Policy and Code of 
Conduct, including a stricter client entertainment policy, new due diligence 
protocols, the inclusion of anti-corruption compliance in employee appraisals 
and a very comprehensive new risk-based policy on use of third parties.  Aon 
emphasises that it now ‘bakes’ these policies into other systems and 
processes. 
 
Training.  Providing online training in eight languages for all employees 
worldwide, including scenarios customised for the insurance industry.  
Supplementing this with one-on-one training for personnel in high-risk areas. 
 
Aon’s experience also shows that the cost of building a robust anti-corruption 
framework is small compared to the financial and reputational cost of 
investigations for alleged corruption. 
 
What is a robust anti-corruption system? 
 
An increasing number of consultants and professional services businesses are 
offering advice on what may constitute ‘adequate procedures’ as 
mentioned in the Bribery Act.  Appendix D contains a 20-point checklist 
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drawn up by Transparency International in conjunction with a group of 
multinational companies and other stakeholders.  Most advice in this area 
coalesces around a set of core principles: 
 
• Tone from the top: a zero-tolerance culture should be established from the 
top, with clear direction and responsibility from the board of directors. 
 
• Risk assessment: comprehensive and regular evaluations of the nature 
and extent of risk exposure. 
 
• Policies and procedures: clear, practical and accessible policies and 
procedures that apply to all employees and subsidiaries.  
 
• Effective implementation: proper implementation and embedding of 
policies and procedures throughout the organisation.   
 
• Relationships with Business Partners: risk-based due diligence of all business 
relationships, including the supply chain, agents and intermediaries and all 
forms of joint ventures; and clear communication of the company’s zero-
tolerance approach to bribery. 
 
• Monitoring and Review: regular monitoring and continuous improvement, 
potentially using external reviewers or assurers. 
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6. The Global Competitiveness of the City 
 
The Bribery Act is expected to reinforce the UK’s international reputation for 
setting high standards in the regulation of economic activity and as a country 
that takes corruption seriously.  
 
Companies are unlikely to leave London because of the Bribery Act…  
Concerns are sometimes raised that tighter regulation might deter companies 
from doing business in the City or listing on the London Stock Exchange.  Our 
research suggests that this risk is negligible.  One in three respondents in our 
survey was confident that companies would not leave London as a result of 
tightened bribery regulation.  Although three out of five respondents thought 
this was a risk, only one in twenty thought that companies would ‘probably’ 
be deterred by this development. 
 
Chart 10 
If b rib e ry  re g ula tio n a nd  e nfo rce me nt tig hte n s ig nifica ntly  in the  
UK, will  this  ca use  co mp a nie s  to  g o  e lse whe re ?
Definitely not 32.4%
Possibly 60.3% 
Probably 5.9%
Certainly 1.5%
 
 
 
Indeed, there is no evidence that tightened anti-money laundering 
regulations since 2002 have deterred companies from operating in the City 
(although by contrast there is some evidence that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
deterred companies from operating in the US).   
 
Companies might be deterred at the margin.  Overseas companies might 
perhaps decide against setting up a small subsidiary in London on the 
grounds that this could make them liable for prosecution for bribery in other 
jurisdictions.  However, for reputable businesses, tightened bribery legislation 
might even be regarded as a positive feature, enhancing the signal about a 
company’s reputation that it already gains from listing in such a prestigious 
financial centre.   
 
…and bribery laws are also tightening elsewhere.  London is not the only 
place where regulation, legislation and enforcement against bribery are 
tightening.  Table 3 shows that other significant financial centres are broadly 
in line with London in terms of regulation against bribery and money 
laundering, although London is generally ahead of its competitors in terms of 
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compliance with the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering’s 
Recommendations.  
 
London compares well with other financial centres…  Nor is the City of London 
seen as corrupt relative to its competitors.  Almost 50% of respondents to our 
survey thought that London was less corrupt than other leading financial 
centres, while only 3% thought it was more corrupt.   
 
Chart 11 
Ho w d o  yo u think  Lo ndo n comp are s to  o the r lea d ing  financ ia l 
ce ntres?   
Less corrupt 48.5%
About the same 48.5%
More corrupt 2.9%
 
 
 
In summary, the Bribery Act is unlikely to have a significant adverse impact on 
the City’s global competitiveness.  Few companies are likely to be deterred 
from doing business in such a large and important market.   
 
The positive impact on the City’s reputation in terms of maintaining high 
standards and reputation is likely to be far more important for most 
companies.   
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Table 3: The Regulatory Regime Concerning Bribery in Other Global Financial 
Centres1 
 
Market Country 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index 
score 
OECD Anti-
Bribery 
Convention 
signatory 
OECD 
enforcement 
ranking 
UN 
Convention 
Against 
Corruption 
(UNCAC) 
signed and 
ratified 
Degree of 
compliance with 
the 49 FATF Anti-
Money 
Laundering 
Recommendations 
and Special 
Recommendations 
London/UK 17 Yes Moderate Yes Compliant: 24 
Largely 
compliant:12 
New York/US 19 Yes Active Yes Compliant:15 
Largely 
compliant:28 
Paris/France 24 Yes Moderate Yes No evaluation 
undertaken 
Frankfurt/ 
Germany 
14 Yes Active No Compliant:5  
Largely 
compliant:24 
Zurich/ 
Switzerland 
5 Yes Active Yes Compliant: 11 
Largely 
compliant:21 
Tokyo/Japan 17 Yes Moderate No Compliant:4 
Largely 
compliant:19 
Toronto/ 
Canada 
8 Yes Little or none Yes Compliant: 7 
Largely 
compliant:23  
Hong Kong/China 12 (Hong 
Kong) 
79 (China) 
No n/a Yes Hong Kong 
Compliant:10 
Largely 
compliant:20 
Singapore 3 No n/a Yes Compliant:11 
Largely 
compliant:32 
Dubai/UAE 30 No n/a No Compliant: 5 
Largely 
compliant:15 
 
                                                 
1 Sources: 
CPI: Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, Transparency International, Berlin, 
http://transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009 
OECD enforcement: OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Progress Report 2009, Transparency 
International, Berlin, 
http://transparency.org/publications/publications/conventions/oecd_report_2009 
UNCAC and foreign bribery laws: ‘Anti-Corruption Regulation Worldwide 2009’, Getting the 
Deal Through, London, http://www.gettingthedealthrough.com/books/2/anti-corruption-
regulation/ 
Money laundering rating: OECD Financial Action Task Force Mutual Evaluations 2005-2010 
http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/document/32/0,3343,en_32250379_32236982_35128416_1_1_1_1,00.html 
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7. Conclusions  
 
This report provides an overview of corruption risk for City businesses, focusing 
on the issues raised by the Bribery Act.  It describes the Act and seeks to 
minimise uncertainty for City businesses about how it will be interpreted and 
enforced once it comes into effect.  It also highlights the types of business 
activity which put City businesses at greatest risk in relation to bribery and 
prosecution. 
 
The Bribery Act is expected to reinforce the UK’s international reputation for 
setting high standards in the regulation of economic activity and as a country 
that takes corruption seriously.  A comparison with other leading international 
financial centres indicates that UK regulation and enforcement are already 
among the best in the world, and around half of survey respondents thought 
that London was less corrupt than other leading financial centres, while only 
3% thought that it was more corrupt.  
 
The research conducted for this project suggests that many City businesses 
operate in contexts that make them vulnerable to corruption, such as doing 
business in high-risk countries, relying heavily on agents or subsidiaries, 
interface with public officials, or advising on or providing finance for projects 
in the construction, defence or natural resources sectors.  The drive to win 
new business can, for example, create pressures to skimp on due diligence or 
use local fixers about which little is known.  Companies may also face major 
incentives to pay facilitation payments to avoid delays in transactions.  
However, the new Act imposes strict penalties on individuals as well as 
companies if they bow to these pressures.  Moreover, it puts the onus on 
companies to prevent bribery and corruption from occurring, not least by 
advising individual employees on how to handle these issues on the ground.   
 
Other corruption risks in the City are deeply rooted in activities that may be 
seen as commonplace business practices, such as taking clients out for 
dinner, organising trips to exclusive sporting events, and providing all-
expenses-paid holidays.  Yet extravagant forms of hospitality could now be 
seen as bribes to win new business or maintain existing contracts.  More 
broadly, many transactions are executed under intensive time pressure, 
involve clients that are complete strangers, or are carried out on the 
telephone and hence very difficult to monitor.  All of these factors put 
pressures on careful adherence to ethical standards. 
 
There are also structural problems in the way that some aspects of business 
are organised, leading to potential conflicts of interest, and the increasingly 
sophisticated nature of the financial products that are traded hinders the 
transparency of these transactions.  While not the focus of this report, these 
issues also give rise to corruption risk and would merit further research.   
 
In the light of the new Bribery Act, companies in the City of London and the 
UK’s financial services sector need to reassess their exposure to corruption risk 
and take steps to change policies and procedures where necessary.  
Guidance and advice are available from a number of sources, but 
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companies also need to make sure that everyone in the organisation 
understands and acts in accordance with the internal policies.  
 
In the light of the increasing worldwide anti-bribery legislative framework and 
greater efforts at global enforcement, it is possible that one response could 
simply be more sophisticated forms of corruption. From this perspective, 
companies will need to be constantly alert to the changing risks to ensure 
that their anti-corruption procedures are fit for purpose.  Fundamentally, the 
most effective response for a company faced with high risks is a change in 
culture so that there is a zero-tolerance approach to bribery which is clearly 
understood throughout the company.   
 
That is not necessarily hard to achieve.  Although there can be powerful 
business, social and personal pressures that make it difficult to say no to 
corruption, especially when operating in different business cultures, there are 
many examples of businesses with a good record in this area.  If those 
pressures can be diminished, or more companies perceive that the balance 
of risk has changed and genuinely seek to eliminate bribery, mid-level and 
senior managers will feel supported in their own efforts to act ethically and in 
line with the law.  The Bribery Act will help by making it easier to quote the law 
when saying ‘No’ to corruption.  US companies have found that prominent 
FCPA cases have facilitated their efforts to reject demands for bribes when 
operating overseas. 
 
Nevertheless, companies must be prepared to suffer the cost of losing 
business or withdrawing from a market when they refuse to pay bribes.  These 
are real costs, but they are increasingly likely to be outweighed by the legal, 
reputational and financial risk of acting corruptly.  And these costs fall heavily 
not just on companies but also on individuals.   
 
Recommendations 
 
Recommendations for companies 
• Companies should assess their vulnerability to corruption risk in all areas 
of business and their potential exposure and liabilities under the new 
Bribery Act. 
• Companies should design and implement robust procedures to 
prevent bribery and corruption occurring. 
 
Recommendations for professional associations  
• Professional associations should advise their members on how to deal 
with sector-specific corruption risks. 
 
Recommendations for regulators 
• Regulators should assist with educating companies about the new law 
and the framework for enforcement, including advice on specific 
areas such as facilitation payments. 
• UK enforcement agencies should develop a consistent and 
transparent approach to settlements and plea bargains. 
• The UK government and regulatory bodies should encourage the 
OECD Working Group on Bribery to work for a ban on facilitation 
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payments under the OECD Convention, in order to ensure a level 
playing field. 
 
Further research would be valuable in the following areas: 
• Corruption risks other than bribery in the City, and the extent to which 
there may be undesirable levels of systemic risk in a ‘business as usual’ 
scenario.  Allied to this would be an analysis of whether corruption in 
any form played a role in the recent financial crisis. 
• A periodic collation of statistics and secondary material relating to 
corruption.  As a result of increased enforcement and the Bribery Act, 
surveys and commentaries about corruption risk are being undertaken 
more frequently.  A collation of these statistics and analysis of trends 
would provide a useful overview. 
• Periodic reviews of enforcement of the Bribery Act and an assessment 
of how companies have responded. 
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Appendix A: Bribery Act – Extracts 
© Crown copyright 2010 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2010/ukpga_20100023_en_1 
 
General bribery offences 
 
1 Offences of bribing another person  
(1) A person (“P”) is guilty of an offence if either of the following cases applies.  
(2) Case 1 is where—  
 (a) P offers, promises or gives a financial or other advantage to another 
 person, and  
 (b) P intends the advantage—  
  (i) to induce a person to perform improperly a relevant function or  
  activity, or  
  (ii) to reward a person for the improper performance of such a  
  function or activity.  
(3) Case 2 is where—  
 (a) P offers, promises or gives a financial or other advantage to another 
 person, and  
 (b) P knows or believes that the acceptance of the advantage would itself 
 constitute the improper performance of a relevant function or activity.  
(4) In case 1 it does not matter whether the person to whom the advantage is 
offered, promised or given is the same person as the person who is to perform, or has 
performed, the function or activity concerned.  
(5) In cases 1 and 2 it does not matter whether the advantage is offered, promised or 
given by P directly or through a third party.  
 
2 Offences relating to being bribed  
(1) A person (“R”) is guilty of an offence if any of the following cases applies.  
(2) Case 3 is where R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other 
advantage intending that, in consequence, a relevant function or activity should be 
performed improperly (whether by R or another person).  
(3) Case 4 is where—  
 (a) R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other advantage, 
 and  
 (b) the request, agreement or acceptance itself constitutes the improper 
 performance by R of a relevant function or activity.  
(4) Case 5 is where R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other 
advantage as a reward for the improper performance (whether by R or another 
person) of a relevant function or activity.  
(5) Case 6 is where, in anticipation of or in consequence of R requesting, agreeing to 
receive or accepting a financial or other advantage, a relevant function or activity is 
performed improperly—  
 (a) by R, or  
 (b) by another person at R’s request or with R’s assent or acquiescence.  
(6) In cases 3 to 6 it does not matter—  
 (a) whether R requests, agrees to receive or accepts (or is to request, agree 
 to receive or accept) the advantage directly or through a third party,  
 (b) whether the advantage is (or is to be) for the benefit of R or another 
 person.  
(7) In cases 4 to 6 it does not matter whether R knows or believes that the 
performance of the function or activity is improper.  
(8) In case 6, where a person other than R is performing the function or activity, it also 
does not matter whether that person knows or believes that the performance of the 
function or activity is improper.  
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3 Function or activity to which bribe relates 
(1) For the purposes of this Act a function or activity is a relevant function or activity 
if—  
 (a) it falls within subsection (2), and  
 (b) meets one or more of conditions A to C.  
(2) The following functions and activities fall within this subsection—  
 (a) any function of a public nature,  
 (b) any activity connected with a business,  
 (c) any activity performed in the course of a person’s employment,  
 (d) any activity performed by or on behalf of a body of persons (whether 
 corporate or unincorporate).  
(3) Condition A is that a person performing the function or activity is expected to 
perform it in good faith.  
(4) Condition B is that a person performing the function or activity is expected to 
perform it impartially.  
(5) Condition C is that a person performing the function or activity is in a position of 
trust by virtue of performing it.  
(6) A function or activity is a relevant function or activity even if it—  
 (a) has no connection with the United Kingdom, and  
 (b) is performed in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom.  
(7) In this section “business” includes trade or profession.  
 
4 Improper performance to which bribe relates 
(1) For the purposes of this Act a relevant function or activity—  
 (a) is performed improperly if it is performed in breach of a relevant 
 expectation, and  
 (b) is to be treated as being performed improperly if there is a failure to 
 perform the function or activity and that failure is itself a breach of a relevant 
 expectation.  
(2) In subsection (1) “relevant expectation”—  
 (a) in relation to a function or activity which meets condition A or B, means 
 the expectation mentioned in the condition concerned, and  
 (b) in relation to a function or activity which meets condition C, means any 
 expectation as to the manner in which, or the reasons for which, the function 
 or activity will be performed that arises from the position of trust mentioned in 
 that condition.  
(3) Anything that a person does (or omits to do) arising from or in connection with 
that person’s past performance of a relevant function or activity is to be treated for 
the purposes of this Act as being done (or omitted) by that person in the 
performance of that function or activity.  
 
5 Expectation test  
(1) For the purposes of sections 3 and 4, the test of what is expected is a test of what 
a reasonable person in the United Kingdom would expect in relation to the 
performance of the type of function or activity concerned.  
(2) In deciding what such a person would expect in relation to the performance of a 
function or activity where the performance is not subject to the law of any part of the 
United Kingdom, any local custom or practice is to be disregarded unless it is 
permitted or required by the written law applicable to the country or territory 
concerned.  
(3) In subsection (2) “written law” means law contained in—  
 (a) any written constitution, or provision made by or under legislation, 
 applicable to the country or territory concerned, or  
 (b) any judicial decision which is so applicable and is evidenced in published 
 written sources.  
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Bribery of foreign public officials 
 
6 Bribery of foreign public officials  
(1) A person (“P”) who bribes a foreign public official (“F”) is guilty of an offence if P’s 
intention is to influence F in F’s capacity as a foreign public official.  
(2) P must also intend to obtain or retain—  
 (a) business, or  
 (b) an advantage in the conduct of business.  
(3) P bribes F if, and only if—  
 (a) directly or through a third party, P offers, promises or gives any financial or 
 other advantage—  
  (i) to F, or  
  (ii) to another person at F’s request or with F’s assent or acquiescence, 
  and  
 (b) F is neither permitted nor required by the written law applicable to F to be 
 influenced in F’s capacity as a foreign public official by the offer, promise or 
 gift.  
(4) References in this section to influencing F in F’s capacity as a foreign public official 
mean influencing F in the performance of F’s functions as such an official, which 
includes—  
 (a) any omission to exercise those functions, and  
 (b) any use of F’s position as such an official, even if not within F’s authority.  
(5) “Foreign public official” means an individual who—  
 (a) holds a legislative, administrative or judicial position of any kind, whether 
 appointed or elected, of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom (or 
 any subdivision of such a country or territory),  
 (b) exercises a public function—  
  (i) for or on behalf of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom 
  (or any subdivision of such a country or territory), or  
  (ii) for any public agency or public enterprise of that country or  
 territory (or subdivision), or  
 (c) is an official or agent of a public international organisation.  
(6) “Public international organisation” means an organisation whose members are 
any of the following—  
 (a) countries or territories,  
 (b) governments of countries or territories,  
 (c) other public international organisations,  
 (d) a mixture of any of the above.  
(7) For the purposes of subsection (3)(b), the written law applicable to F is—  
 (a) where the performance of the functions of F which P intends to influence 
 would be subject to the law of any part of the United Kingdom, the law of 
 that part of the United Kingdom,  
 (b) where paragraph (a) does not apply and F is an official or agent of a 
 public international organisation, the applicable written rules of that 
 organisation,  
 (c) where paragraphs (a) and (b) do not apply, the law of the country or 
 territory in relation to which F is a foreign public official so far as that law is 
 contained in—  
  (i) any written constitution, or provision made by or under legislation, 
  applicable to the country or territory concerned, or  
  (ii) any judicial decision which is so applicable and is evidenced in  
 published written sources.  
(8) For the purposes of this section, a trade or profession is a business.  
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Failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery 
 
7 Failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery  
(1) A relevant commercial organisation (“C”) is guilty of an offence under this section 
if a person (“A”) associated with C bribes another person intending—  
 (a) to obtain or retain business for C, or  
 (b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business for C.  
(2) But it is a defence for C to prove that C had in place adequate procedures 
designed to prevent persons associated with C from undertaking such conduct.  
(3) For the purposes of this section, A bribes another person if, and only if, A—  
 (a) is, or would be, guilty of an offence under section 1 or 6 (whether or not A 
 has been prosecuted for such an offence), or  
 (b) would be guilty of such an offence if section 12(2)(c) and (4) were 
 omitted.  
(4) See section 8 for the meaning of a person associated with C and see section 9 for 
a duty on the Secretary of State to publish guidance.  
(5) In this section—  
“partnership” means— 
(a) a partnership within the Partnership Act 1890, or 
(b) a limited partnership registered under the Limited Partnerships Act 1907, 
or a firm or entity of a similar character formed under the law of a country or 
territory outside the United Kingdom, 
“relevant commercial organisation” means— 
(a) a body which is incorporated under the law of any part of the United 
Kingdom and which carries on a business (whether there or elsewhere), 
(b) any other body corporate (wherever incorporated) which carries on a 
business, or part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom, 
(c) a partnership which is formed under the law of any part of the United 
Kingdom and which carries on a business (whether there or elsewhere), or 
(d) any other partnership (wherever formed) which carries on a business, or 
part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom, 
and, for the purposes of this section, a trade or profession is a business. 
 
8 Meaning of associated person 
(1) For the purposes of section 7, a person (“A”) is associated with C if (disregarding 
any bribe under consideration) A is a person who performs services for or on behalf of 
C.  
(2) The capacity in which A performs services for or on behalf of C does not matter.  
(3) Accordingly A may (for example) be C’s employee, agent or subsidiary.  
(4) Whether or not A is a person who performs services for or on behalf of C is to be 
determined by reference to all the relevant circumstances and not merely by 
reference to the nature of the relationship between A and C.  
(5) But if A is an employee of C, it is to be presumed unless the contrary is shown that 
A is a person who performs services for or on behalf of C.  
 
9 Guidance about commercial organisations preventing bribery 
(1) The Secretary of State must publish guidance about procedures that relevant 
commercial organisations can put in place to prevent persons associated with them 
from bribing as mentioned in section 7(1).  
(2) The Secretary of State may, from time to time, publish revisions to guidance under 
this section or revised guidance.  
(3) The Secretary of State must consult the Scottish Ministers before publishing 
anything under this section.  
(4) Publication under this section is to be in such manner as the Secretary of State 
considers appropriate.  
(5) Expressions used in this section have the same meaning as in section 7.  
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Prosecution and penalties 
 
10 Consent to prosecution 
(1) No proceedings for an offence under this Act may be instituted in England and 
Wales except by or with the consent of—  
 (a) the Director of Public Prosecutions,  
 (b) the Director of the Serious Fraud Office, or  
 (c) the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions.  
(2) No proceedings for an offence under this Act may be instituted in Northern Ireland 
except by or with the consent of—  
 (a) the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland, or  
 (b) the Director of the Serious Fraud Office.  
(3) No proceedings for an offence under this Act may be instituted in England and 
Wales or Northern Ireland by a person—  
 (a) who is acting—  
  (i) under the direction or instruction of the Director of Public  
  Prosecutions, the Director of the Serious Fraud Office or the Director of 
  Revenue and Customs Prosecutions, or  
  (ii) on behalf of such a Director, or  
 (b) to whom such a function has been assigned by such a Director,  
 except with the consent of the Director concerned to the institution of the 
 proceedings. 
(4) The Director of Public Prosecutions, the Director of the Serious Fraud Office and 
the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions must exercise personally any 
function under subsection (1), (2) or (3) of giving consent.  
(5) The only exception is if—  
 (a) the Director concerned is unavailable, and  
 (b) there is another person who is designated in writing by the Director acting 
 personally as the person who is authorised to exercise any such function when 
 the Director is unavailable.  
(6) In that case, the other person may exercise the function but must do so 
personally.  
(7) Subsections (4) to (6) apply instead of any other provisions which would otherwise 
have enabled any function of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Director of the 
Serious Fraud Office or the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions under 
subsection (1), (2) or (3) of giving consent to be exercised by a person other than the 
Director concerned.  
(8) No proceedings for an offence under this Act may be instituted in Northern Ireland 
by virtue of section 36 of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 (delegation of the 
functions of the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland to persons other 
than the Deputy Director) except with the consent of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions for Northern Ireland to the institution of the proceedings.  
(9) The Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland must exercise personally 
any function under subsection (2) or (8) of giving consent unless the function is 
exercised personally by the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern 
Ireland by virtue of section 30(4) or (7) of the Act of 2002 (powers of Deputy Director 
to exercise functions of Director).  
(10) Subsection (9) applies instead of section 36 of the Act of 2002 in relation to the 
functions of the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland and the Deputy 
Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland under, or (as the case may be) by 
virtue of, subsections (2) and (8) above of giving consent.  
 
11 Penalties  
(1) An individual guilty of an offence under section 1, 2 or 6 is liable—  
 (a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 
 months, or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both,  
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 (b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 
 years, or to a fine, or to both.  
(2) Any other person guilty of an offence under section 1, 2 or 6 is liable—  
 (a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum,  
 (b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine.  
(3) A person guilty of an offence under section 7 is liable on conviction on indictment 
to a fine.  
(4) The reference in subsection (1)(a) to 12 months is to be read—  
 (a) in its application to England and Wales in relation to an offence 
 committed before the commencement of section 154(1) of the Criminal 
 Justice Act 2003, and  
(b) in its application to Northern Ireland,  
as a reference to 6 months. 
 
Other provisions about offences 
 
12 Offences under this Act: territorial application 
(1) An offence is committed under section 1, 2 or 6 in England and Wales, Scotland or 
Northern Ireland if any act or omission which forms part of the offence takes place in 
that part of the United Kingdom.  
(2) Subsection (3) applies if—  
 (a) no act or omission which forms part of an offence under section 1, 2 or 6 
 takes place in the United Kingdom,  
 (b) a person’s acts or omissions done or made outside the United Kingdom 
 would form part of such an offence if done or made in the United Kingdom, 
 and  
 (c) that person has a close connection with the United Kingdom.  
(3) In such a case—  
 (a) the acts or omissions form part of the offence referred to in subsection 
 (2)(a), and  
 (b) proceedings for the offence may be taken at any place in the United 
 Kingdom.  
(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(c) a person has a close connection with the 
United Kingdom if, and only if, the person was one of the following at the time the 
acts or omissions concerned were done or made—  
 (a) a British citizen,  
 (b) a British overseas territories citizen,  
 (c) a British National (Overseas),  
 (d) a British Overseas citizen,  
 (e) a person who under the British Nationality Act 1981 was a British subject,  
 (f) a British protected person within the meaning of that Act,  
 (g) an individual ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom,  
 (h) a body incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom,  
 (i) a Scottish partnership.  
(5) An offence is committed under section 7 irrespective of whether the acts or 
omissions which form part of the offence take place in the United Kingdom or 
elsewhere.  
(6) Where no act or omission which forms part of an offence under section 7 takes 
place in the United Kingdom, proceedings for the offence may be taken at any 
place in the United Kingdom.  
(7) Subsection (8) applies if, by virtue of this section, proceedings for an offence are 
to be taken in Scotland against a person.  
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(8) Such proceedings may be taken—  
 (a) in any sheriff court district in which the person is apprehended or in 
 custody, or  
 (b) in such sheriff court district as the Lord Advocate may determine.  
 (9) In subsection (8) “sheriff court district” is to be read in accordance with 
 section 307(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.  
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Appendix B: Transparency International Corruption   
      Perceptions Index 2009 
 
This report has argued that doing business in “corrupt environments” can 
make companies vulnerable to corruption and bribery.  However, assessing 
the corruption risk in a particular environment is not straightforward.  Each 
year, Transparency International produces a Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI), which shows perceived levels of public-sector corruption in most of the 
countries and territories of the world.  This can be used as a guide to 
corruption levels in a particular environment. 
• The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) table shows a country's ranking 
and score, the number of surveys used to determine the score, and the 
confidence range of the scoring. 
• The rank shows how one country compares to others included in the 
index. The CPI score indicates the perceived level of public sector 
corruption in a country/territory. 
• The CPI is based on 13 independent surveys. However, not all surveys 
include all countries. The surveys used column indicates how many 
surveys were relied upon to determine the score for that country. 
• The confidence range indicates the reliability of the CPI scores and 
tells us that allowing for a margin of error, we can be 90% confident 
that the true score for this country lies within this range. 
Rank Country/Territory  CPI 2009 
Score  
Surveys 
Used  
Confidence 
Range  
1  New Zealand  9.4  6  9.1 - 9.5  
2  Denmark  9.3  6  9.1 - 9.5  
3  Singapore  9.2  9  9.0 - 9.4  
3  Sweden  9.2  6  9.0 - 9.3  
5  Switzerland  9.0  6  8.9 - 9.1  
6  Finland  8.9  6  8.4 - 9.4  
6  Netherlands  8.9  6  8.7 - 9.0  
8  Australia  8.7  8  8.3 - 9.0  
8  Canada  8.7  6  8.5 - 9.0  
8  Iceland  8.7  4  7.5 - 9.4  
11  Norway  8.6  6  8.2 - 9.1  
12  Hong Kong  8.2  8  7.9 - 8.5  
12  Luxembourg  8.2  6  7.6 - 8.8  
14  Germany  8.0  6  7.7 - 8.3  
14  Ireland  8.0  6  7.8 - 8.4  
16  Austria  7.9  6  7.4 - 8.3  
17  Japan  7.7  8  7.4 - 8.0  
17  United Kingdom  7.7  6  7.3 - 8.2  
19  United States  7.5  8  6.9 - 8.0  
20  Barbados  7.4  4  6.6 - 8.2  
21  Belgium  7.1  6  6.9 - 7.3  
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22  Qatar  7.0  6  5.8 - 8.1  
22  Saint Lucia  7.0  3  6.7 - 7.5  
24  France  6.9  6  6.5 - 7.3  
25  Chile  6.7  7  6.5 - 6.9  
25  Uruguay  6.7  5  6.4 - 7.1  
27  Cyprus  6.6  4  6.1 - 7.1  
27  Estonia  6.6  8  6.1 - 6.9  
27  Slovenia  6.6  8  6.3 - 6.9  
30  United Arab Emirates  6.5  5  5.5 - 7.5  
31  Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines  
6.4  3  4.9 - 7.5  
32  Israel  6.1  6  5.4 - 6.7  
32  Spain  6.1  6  5.5 - 6.6  
34  Dominica  5.9  3  4.9 - 6.7  
35  Portugal  5.8  6  5.5 - 6.2  
35  Puerto Rico  5.8  4  5.2 - 6.3  
37  Botswana  5.6  6  5.1 - 6.3  
37  Taiwan  5.6  9  5.4 - 5.9  
39  Brunei Darussalam  5.5  4  4.7 - 6.4  
39  Oman  5.5  5  4.4 - 6.5  
39  Korea (South)  5.5  9  5.3 - 5.7  
42  Mauritius  5.4  6  5.0 - 5.9  
43  Costa Rica  5.3  5  4.7 - 5.9  
43  Macau  5.3  3  3.3 - 6.9  
45  Malta  5.2  4  4.0 - 6.2  
46  Bahrain  5.1  5  4.2 - 5.8  
46  Cape Verde  5.1  3  3.3 - 7.0  
46  Hungary  5.1  8  4.6 - 5.7  
49  Bhutan  5.0  4  4.3 - 5.6  
49  Jordan  5.0  7  3.9 - 6.1  
49  Poland  5.0  8  4.5 - 5.5  
52  Czech Republic  4.9  8  4.3 - 5.6  
52  Lithuania  4.9  8  4.4 - 5.4  
54  Seychelles  4.8  3  3.0 - 6.7  
55  South Africa  4.7  8  4.3 - 4.9  
56  Latvia  4.5  6  4.1 - 4.9  
56  Malaysia  4.5  9  4.0 - 5.1  
56  Namibia  4.5  6  3.9 - 5.1  
56  Samoa  4.5  3  3.3 - 5.3  
56  Slovakia  4.5  8  4.1 - 4.9  
61  Cuba  4.4  3  3.5 - 5.1  
61  Turkey  4.4  7  3.9 - 4.9  
63  Italy  4.3  6  3.8 - 4.9  
63  Saudi Arabia  4.3  5  3.1 - 5.3  
65  Tunisia  4.2  6  3.0 - 5.5  
66  Croatia  4.1  8  3.7 - 4.5  
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66  Georgia  4.1  7  3.4 - 4.7  
66  Kuwait  4.1  5  3.2 - 5.1  
69  Ghana  3.9  7  3.2 - 4.6  
69  Montenegro  3.9  5  3.5 - 4.4  
71  Bulgaria  3.8  8  3.2 - 4.5  
71  FYR Macedonia  3.8  6  3.4 - 4.2  
71  Greece  3.8  6  3.2 - 4.3  
71  Romania  3.8  8  3.2 - 4.3  
75  Brazil  3.7  7  3.3 - 4.3  
75  Colombia  3.7  7  3.1 - 4.3  
75  Peru  3.7  7  3.4 - 4.1  
75  Suriname  3.7  3  3.0 - 4.7  
79  Burkina Faso  3.6  7  2.8 - 4.4  
79  China  3.6  9  3.0 - 4.2  
79  Swaziland  3.6  3  3.0 - 4.7  
79  Trinidad and Tobago  3.6  4  3.0 - 4.3  
83  Serbia  3.5  6  3.3 - 3.9  
84  El Salvador  3.4  5  3.0 - 3.8  
84  Guatemala  3.4  5  3.0 - 3.9  
84  India  3.4  10  3.2 - 3.6  
84  Panama  3.4  5  3.1 - 3.7  
84  Thailand  3.4  9  3.0 - 3.8  
89  Lesotho  3.3  6  2.8 - 3.8  
89  Malawi  3.3  7  2.7 - 3.9  
89  Mexico  3.3  7  3.2 - 3.5  
89  Moldova  3.3  6  2.7 - 4.0  
89  Morocco  3.3  6  2.8 - 3.9  
89  Rwanda  3.3  4  2.9 - 3.7  
95  Albania  3.2  6  3.0 - 3.3  
95  Vanuatu  3.2  3  2.3 - 4.7  
97  Liberia  3.1  3  1.9 - 3.8  
97  Sri Lanka  3.1  7  2.8 - 3.4  
99  Bosnia and Herzegovina  3.0  7  2.6 - 3.4  
99  Dominican Republic  3.0  5  2.9 - 3.2  
99  Jamaica  3.0  5  2.8 - 3.3  
99  Madagascar  3.0  7  2.8 - 3.2  
99  Senegal  3.0  7  2.5 - 3.6  
99  Tonga  3.0  3  2.6 - 3.3  
99  Zambia  3.0  7  2.8 - 3.2  
106  Argentina  2.9  7  2.6 - 3.1  
106  Benin  2.9  6  2.3 - 3.4  
106  Gabon  2.9  3  2.6 - 3.1  
106  Gambia  2.9  5  1.6 - 4.0  
106  Niger  2.9  5  2.7 - 3.0  
111  Algeria  2.8  6  2.5 - 3.1  
111  Djibouti  2.8  4  2.3 - 3.2  
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111  Egypt  2.8  6  2.6 - 3.1  
111  Indonesia  2.8  9  2.4 - 3.2  
111  Kiribati  2.8  3  2.3 - 3.3  
111  Mali  2.8  6  2.4 - 3.2  
111  Sao Tome and Principe  2.8  3  2.4 - 3.3  
111  Solomon Islands  2.8  3  2.3 - 3.3  
111  Togo  2.8  5  1.9 - 3.9  
120  Armenia  2.7  7  2.6 - 2.8  
120  Bolivia  2.7  6  2.4 - 3.1  
120  Ethiopia  2.7  7  2.4 - 2.9  
120  Kazakhstan  2.7  7  2.1 - 3.3  
120  Mongolia  2.7  7  2.4 - 3.0  
120  Vietnam  2.7  9  2.4 - 3.1  
126  Eritrea  2.6  4  1.6 - 3.8  
126  Guyana  2.6  4  2.5 - 2.7  
126  Syria  2.6  5  2.2 - 2.9  
126  Tanzania  2.6  7  2.4 - 2.9  
130  Honduras  2.5  6  2.2 - 2.8  
130  Lebanon  2.5  3  1.9 - 3.1  
130  Libya  2.5  6  2.2 - 2.8  
130  Maldives  2.5  4  1.8 - 3.2  
130  Mauritania  2.5  7  2.0 - 3.3  
130  Mozambique  2.5  7  2.3 - 2.8  
130  Nicaragua  2.5  6  2.3 - 2.7  
130  Nigeria  2.5  7  2.2 - 2.7  
130  Uganda  2.5  7  2.1 - 2.8  
139  Bangladesh  2.4  7  2.0 - 2.8  
139  Belarus  2.4  4  2.0 - 2.8  
139  Pakistan  2.4  7  2.1 - 2.7  
139  Philippines  2.4  9  2.1 - 2.7  
143  Azerbaijan  2.3  7  2.0 - 2.6  
143  Comoros  2.3  3  1.6 - 3.3  
143  Nepal  2.3  6  2.0 - 2.6  
146  Cameroon  2.2  7  1.9 - 2.6  
146  Ecuador  2.2  5  2.0 - 2.5  
146  Kenya  2.2  7  1.9 - 2.5  
146  Russia  2.2  8  1.9 - 2.4  
146  Sierra Leone  2.2  5  1.9 - 2.4  
146  Timor-Leste  2.2  5  1.8 - 2.6  
146  Ukraine  2.2  8  2.0 - 2.6  
146  Zimbabwe  2.2  7  1.7 - 2.8  
154  Côte d´Ivoire  2.1  7  1.8 - 2.4  
154  Papua New Guinea  2.1  5  1.7 - 2.5  
154  Paraguay  2.1  5  1.7 - 2.5  
154  Yemen  2.1  4  1.6 - 2.5  
158  Cambodia  2.0  8  1.8 - 2.2  
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158  Central African Republic  2.0  4  1.9 - 2.2  
158  Laos  2.0  4  1.6 - 2.6  
158  Tajikistan  2.0  8  1.6 - 2.5  
162  Angola  1.9  5  1.8 - 1.9  
162  Congo Brazzaville  1.9  5  1.6 - 2.1  
162  Democratic Republic of 
Congo  
1.9  5  1.7 - 2.1  
162  Guinea-Bissau  1.9  3  1.8 - 2.0  
162  Kyrgyzstan  1.9  7  1.8 - 2.1  
162  Venezuela  1.9  7  1.8 - 2.0  
168  Burundi  1.8  6  1.6 - 2.0  
168  Equatorial Guinea  1.8  3  1.6 - 1.9  
168  Guinea  1.8  5  1.7 - 1.8  
168  Haiti  1.8  3  1.4 - 2.3  
168  Iran  1.8  3  1.7 - 1.9  
168  Turkmenistan  1.8  4  1.7 - 1.9  
174  Uzbekistan  1.7  6  1.5 - 1.8  
175  Chad  1.6  6  1.5 - 1.7  
176  Iraq  1.5  3  1.2 - 1.8  
176  Sudan  1.5  5  1.4 - 1.7  
178  Myanmar  1.4  3  0.9 - 1.8  
179  Afghanistan  1.3  4  1.0 - 1.5  
180  Somalia  1.1  3  0.9 - 1.4  
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Appendix C: Transparency International Bribe Payers’ Index 
2008 
The Bribe Payers’ Index (BPI) ranks the likelihood of businesses from 22 top 
exporting countries to bribe abroad. These 22 countries account for 
approximately 75% of total foreign direct investment outflows and export 
goods worldwide. The Index is based on interviews with almost 3,000 senior 
business executives working in 26 countries.  The 2008 BPI also includes 
supplementary information on perceptions of corruption across 19 business 
sectors.  
Confidence  
Interval 95%  
Rank  Country/ 
Territory  
BPI  
2008 Score  
Respondents Standard 
Deviation  
Lower 
Bound  
Upper 
Bound  
1  Belgium  8.8  252  2.00  8.5  9.0  
1  Canada  8.8  264  1.80  8.5  9.0  
3  Netherlands 8.7  255  1.98  8.4  8.9  
3  Switzerland  8.7  256  1.98  8.4  8.9  
5  Germany  8.6  513  2.14  8.4  8.8  
5  Japan  8.6  316  2.11  8.3  8.8  
5  United 
Kingdom  
8.6  506  2.10  8.4  8.7  
8  Australia  8.5  240  2.23  8.2  8.7  
9  France  8.1  462  2.48  7.9  8.3  
9  Singapore  8.1  243  2.60  7.8  8.4  
9  United 
States  
8.1  718  2.43  7.9  8.3  
12  Spain  7.9  355  2.49  7.6  8.1  
13  Hong Kong  7.6  288  2.67  7.3  7.9  
14  South 
Africa  
7.5  177  2.78  7.1  8.0  
14  South 
Korea  
7.5  231  2.79  7.1  7.8  
14  Taiwan  7.5  287  2.76  7.1  7.8  
17  Brazil  7.4  225  2.78  7.0  7.7  
17  Italy  7.4  421  2.89  7.1  7.7  
19  India  6.8  257  3.31  6.4  7.3  
20  Mexico  6.6  123  2.97  6.1  7.2  
21  China  6.5  634  3.35  6.2  6.8  
22  Russia  5.9  114  3.66  5.2  6.6  
 
This table shows the 2008 BPI results along with additional statistical 
information that indicates the level of agreement among respondents about 
the country’s performance, and the precision of the results.  
Scores range from 0 to 10, indicating the likelihood of businesses 
headquartered in these countries to bribe when operating abroad. The 
higher the score for the country, the lower the likelihood of companies from 
this country to engage in bribery when doing business abroad.  
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The standard deviation is provided to give an indication of the degree of 
agreement among respondents in relation to each country: the smaller the 
standard deviation, the broader the consensus among respondents. The 
confidence intervals show the range of minimum and maximum values where 
with 95% of confidence the true value of the index lies.  
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Appendix D Anti-Bribery 20-Point Checklist  
Aligned to the Business Principles for Countering Bribery 
Copyright Transparency International 2009 
 
How do you feel your company stands on countering bribery? 
 
POLICY 
1 Is there a formal up-to-date published policy of zero tolerance of bribery? 
2 Is there a public commitment to be consistent with all relevant anti-bribery 
laws in all the jurisdictions in which your company operates? 
3 Have you made a commitment to implement an anti-bribery Programme1? 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
4 Do you carry out regular risk assessment to determine the risks of bribery and 
tailor the Programme to mitigate these risks? 
5 Does your Programme have detailed policies, procedures and controls for: 
• gifts, hospitality and travel expenses? 
• political contributions? 
• charitable donations and sponsorships? 
• facilitation payments? 
6 Does your leadership2 show active commitment to the Programme and act 
as an example for transparency and integrity? 
7 Does your leadership assign unambiguous responsibility and authority to 
managers for carrying out the Programme? 
8 Is the Programme implemented in all business entities over which your 
company has effective control? 
9 Do you encourage an equivalent Programme in business entities in which 
your company has a significant investment or with which it has significant 
business relationships? 
10 Is the Programme communicated to: 
• all employees? 
• business partners? 
• other stakeholders? 
11 Do your human resources practices3 reflect your company’s commitment 
to the Programme? 
12 Is tailored training provided to: 
• all Directors, managers, employees and agents? 
• key high risk third parties including other intermediaries, contractors 
and suppliers? 
13 Does your company provide secure and accessible channels through 
which employees and others can obtain advice or raise concerns 
(‘whistleblowing”) without risk of reprisal? 
14 Are there internal controls to counter bribery comprising financial and 
organisational checks over accounting and record keeping practices and 
related business processes? 
 
MONITORING AND REVIEW 
15 Are the internal control systems, in particular the accounting and record 
keeping practices, subjected to regular review and audit? 
16 Do you have procedures in place to deal with any incidents of bribery? 
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17 Do your senior management periodically review the Programme’s 
suitability and effectiveness and implement improvements? 
18 Does the Audit Committee, Board or equivalent body make a regular 
independent assessment of the adequacy of the Programme? 
19 Does your company publicly disclose information about its programme 
and its implementation? 
20 Do you carry out external assurance of the Programme and is the opinion 
statement published publicly? 
 
The Business Principles for Countering Bribery can be found at 
www.transparency.org. For further information please contact: 
businessprinciples@transparency.org 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- 
1 The whole of an enterprise’s anti-bribery efforts including values, code of 
conduct, detailed policies and procedures, risk management, internal and 
external communication, training and guidance, internal controls, 
oversight, monitoring and assurance. 
2 Owner, Board or equivalent body, chair and/or chief executive 
3Including those for recruitment, training, performance evaluation, 
remuneration, recognition and promotion
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